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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) economies and global climate 
change mitigation policies with a view to determining the energy exports 
demand security risks of OPEC member states. The successful 
implementation of a universally adopted climate regime has been marred 
with controversies as different interest gro ups have raised their concerns 
about all the options presented so far. OPEC as the major crude oil 
exporting group in the world has been in the forefront of these debates 
and negotiations. OPEC’s major concern is the envisaged adverse impacts 
of the industrialised countries carbon reductions on its members ' 
economies. Several studies have shown that when industrialised countries 
adopt carbon dioxide emissions reduction policies in line with the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as carbon taxes 
and energy efficiency strategies, OPEC’s net price of crude oil decreases at 
the same time as a reduction in the quantity of crude oil products sold. 
OPEC believes that such climate change policy-induced fall in crude oil 
exports revenues would have a significant negative effect on its members'  
economies.  
With the limitations related to the assumptions of the existing energy 
economy models on the impacts of climate change mitigation policies on 
OPEC’s economies  (Barnett et al, 2004), this study opts for a risk based 
model. This model quantifies the energy exports demand security risks of 
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OPEC members with special interest on crude oil. This study also 
investigates the effects of carbon reduction policies on crude oil prices 
vis-à-vis the impacts of crude oil prices on OPEC’s economies. To address 
these three main issues, this thesis adopts a three -prong approach. 
The first paper addresses the impacts of climate change mitigation on 
crude oil prices using a dynamic panel model. Results from the e stimated 
dynamic panel model show that the relationship between crude oil prices 
and climate change mitigation is positive. The results also indicate that a 
1% change in carbon intensity causes a 1.6% and 8.4% changes in crude oil 
prices in the short run and long run, respectively.  
The second paper focuses on the impacts of crude oil prices on OPEC 
economies using a panel vector auto regression (VAR) approach, 
highlighting the exposure of OPEC members to the volatile crude oil 
prices. The findings from the panel VAR model show that the relationship 
between OPEC members’ economic growth and crude oil prices is positive 
and economic growth in OPEC member states respond positively and 
significantly to a 10% deviation in crude oil prices by 1.4% in the short run  
and 1.7% in the long run.  
The third paper creates an index of the risks OPEC members face when 
there is a decline in the demand for their crude oil exports. To show these 
risks, this study develops two indexes to show the country level risks and 
the contributions to the OPEC-wide risks exposure. The results from the 
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indexes show that OPEC members that are more dependent on crude oil 
exports are faced with more energy exports demand risks.  
The findings from this thesis are relevant for the development of a new 
OPEC energy policy that should accommodate the realities of a sustainable 
global climate regime. They are also useful to the respective governments 
of the countries that are members of OPEC and non -OPEC crude oil 
exporting countries. Finally, the out comes of this thesis also contribute to 
the climate change and energy economics literature, especially for 
academic and subsequent research purposes.  
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Preface 
1. Motivation for the Thesis 
One of the unresolved issues in the global effort towards a sustainable 
climate regime is the extent to which the developed countries emissions 
reduction measures will impact on the economies of the oil exporting 
countries, and how these impacts can be minimised (Barnett and Dessai, 
2002). The impact of the United Nation Framework Conventio n on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Annex 1 countries1 climate change mitigation policy 
responses on the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
crude oil exports is an issue that will make or mar the implementation of 
the existing or new global agreements on climate change mitigation. 
Several energy economy models suggest that responsive policies and 
measures to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent 
climate change policies by developed and emerging economies will reduce 
their demand for fossil based fuels such as crude oil . The reduction in the 
demand for fossil fuels by Annex 1 countries, which account for 60% of 
world oil and gas consumptions, would also reduce the revenues received 
by the fossil energy producers and suppliers (Barnett and Dessai, 2002; 
Henman, 2002; Barnett et al, 2004).  
This thesis focuses on the implications of the impacts of climate change 
mitigation policies on OPEC economies.  With the recent extension of the 
                                                          
1
Annex 1 parties include the industrial ized countries that were members of the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries 
with economies in transit ion (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the 
Balt ic States, and several Central and Eastern European States (UNFCCC, 2010).  
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UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol to a second commitment peri od, 2013 – 2020, 
(UNFCCC, 2012) and the controversy trailing the limitations of the 
assumptions of estimated energy economy models on the first 
commitment period, 2008 – 2012 (Barnett et al, 2004), it  is necessary to 
model and measure the risk exposure of OPEC members to the potential 
decline in crude oil demand. The literature is saturated with studies on 
the impacts of climate change mitigation on developed countries but there 
is no study on modelling the risk that OPEC economies face as a result of 
decline in their major source of public sector revenues – crude oil.  
 Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC and Article(s) 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto 
Protocol set the groundwork for this study. Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC 
commits parties to give full consideration to the act ions that are 
necessary, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer 
of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing 
country parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or 
the impact of the implementation of the response measures (UNFCCC, 
2012). This UNFCCC’s Article focuses on countries whose economies are 
highly dependent on the incomes generated from the production, 
processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels (UNFCCC, 
2012). 
The scope of this study is limited to the review and analysis of the 
structure of OPEC economies, climate change mitigation policy options, 
the effects of climate change mitigation on crude oil prices, the impacts of 
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crude oil prices on OPEC economies and th e risk index of OPEC member 
states as a result of decline in external crude oil demand . The research 
questions are also tailored in accordance with the scope of the study with 
an attempt to empirically investigate the relationships therein. Therefore, 
this study attempts to answer the following questions:  
 Does climate change mitigation affect crude oil prices?  
 What are the effects of crude oil prices on OPEC economies?  
 What is the OPEC country-level energy exports demand security 
risk?, and 
 What are the contributions of OPEC members to OPEC’s energy 
exports demand security risks? 
2.  The Structure of OPEC Economies and Climate Change Mitigation  
OPEC economies are vulnerable to the effects of climate change as well as 
the adverse effects of the climate change mitigation measures (OPEC, 
2012b). In order to determine the  energy exports demand security risks in  
OPEC economies, it is very important to understand the structure of OPEC 
economies. This section of the study focuses on the structure of OPEC 
economies and their exposure to the impacts of climate mitigation 
measures. In line with Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC, OPEC expects the 
revenues from their crude oil exports to drop significantly as a result of 
the policies and measures adopted by the Annex 1 countries, wh o are the 
dominant importers of OPEC’s crude oil.  
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2.1 OPEC: Structure and Economy 
OPEC’s fossil energy exports account for about 42% of the global oil supply 
and over 25% of global natural gas supply (EC, 2003; OPEC, 2010; 2011). 
OPEC is presently made up of twelve countries (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Venezuela). The economies of OPEC member states are 
heavily dependent on crude oil exports. The decision of OPEC to 
nationalise the major crude oil production activities in 1973 and the oil 
price conflict that followed suit marked the beginning of OPEC’s influence 
as well as the dominance of crude oil exports in their total exports. Crude 
oil exports revenue also became their major source of government 
revenues after the 1973 global oil crisis.  
The economic implications of OPEC’s crude oil export revenues over the 
years have not been solely positive as most OPEC members have 
experienced macroeconomic instabilities. These are usually triggered by 
the exogenous development in the global oil market (Van der Linden et al 
2000). The 1970s were periods of high energy incomes while the 1980s 
saw OPEC economies grappling with low energy incomes . This was 
followed by the recent era of high energy incomes that started in the late 
1990s. Even in these times of high energy export incomes, there are 
periods of economic cris is as a result of energy price shocks as the global 
energy market is price based and the prices are affected by many factors.   
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After the 1973 oil crisis, the industry witnessed the entrance of many non -
OPEC members as producers and exporters of crude oil and gas. This led to 
OPEC losing its overwhelming dominant position in the global oil market 
(Van der Linden, 2000). This loss of dominance made the OPEC cartel weak 
to the rival economic interests and unable to maintain a uniform policy. 
The ability of OPEC to determine the prices or secure a stable crude oil 
exports’ income has been very difficult since then. Although, there is no 
universal agreement in existing studies on the direction of impacts 
concerning the relationship between oil exporting countries’ economies 
and crude oil prices (Ghalayini, 2011; Mahmud, 2009; Rhoubini and Setser, 
2004; Ghanem, 1999; Van der Linden et al,  2000; Stevens and Hulbert, 
2012; Hamilton, 1983 and Darby, 1982), the level s of impact are expected 
to vary with respect to the countries as a result of the polarity  in the 
structures of the economies. With the need for domestic investment and 
economic development, OPEC’s dependence on crude oil exports incomes 
has also polarised the organisation. The only thing that is similar in all the 
economies is their seemingly overt dependence on crude oil exports 
revenues. A brief review and analysis of OPEC economies is presented 
below to show the polarity in the structure of their economies . 
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(i)  Algeria 
Algeria has a state-dominated economy which can be traced to the 
country's socialist post-independence development model (TWF, 2013). 
The country has been undergoing a liberalisation process since the late 
1990s, which has been truncated frequently by the government. This has 
kept the economy in a quasi -open status. Recently, the government 
introduced fresh restrictions on the involvement of foreign investors in it s 
economy and is increasingly hindering the process of privatization of the 
state-owned industries.  
Just like other OPEC economies, petroleum has long been the mainstay of 
the economy and currently accounts for about 60% of budget revenues, 
30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and over 95% of export earnings 
(TWF, 2013). Algeria is presently the sixth largest exporter of natural gas 
and has the tenth largest reserves of natural gas in the world. It also has 
the 16th largest reserves of crude oil global ly. Due to the increasing 
revenue from oil and gas, Algeria has a two hundred billion US Dollars 
($200 billion) foreign currency reserves. The country also maintains an 
impressive budget stabilization fund. Algeria has an external debt burden , 
but it is very low (at about 2% of GDP) compared to other OPEC members. 
The Algerian government has an interest to develop other sectors of the 
economy apart from the energy sector , but has been faced with the 
challenges of high costs and an inert state bureaucracy (T WF, 2011). The 
efforts of the government to diversify the economy have also been facing 
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diverse challenges as a result of lethargic participation by the domestic 
investors outside the energy sector. This development has affected the 
economy leading to rising poverty and youth unemployment rates. 
According to TWF (2011), Algeria began a five-year, $286 billion 
development program in 2010 to update the country's infrastructure and 
provide jobs. The programme which is seen by many as costly and would 
have an adverse impact on the country’s budget is expected to boost the 
economy in the long run. However, this ambitious economic development 
programme can only be successful if structural economic problems like the 
heavy dependence on the energy sector and state control of the economy 
are addressed. 
(ii) Angola 
Angola became a member of OPEC in 2006 to become the latest member 
of the apex crude oil exporting body. In 2007, it had an OPEC production 
quota of 1.9 million barrels per day against the expected 2.5 million 
barrels per day. Presently, in 2013, Angola’s production quota has 
dropped to 1.65million barrels a day. Angola’s economy has witnessed a 
high growth rate in recent years as a result of the high international crude 
oil prices. An increase in oil production o ver the years has sustained this 
growth and is equivalent to about 17% on the average per year from 2005 
to 2008 (TWF, 2013). Currently, crude oil production and its subsidiary 
activities account for about 85% of the country’s GDP, diamond 
production and exports account for 5% and agriculture accounts for 10%. 
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As a country that is recovering from a protracted civil war, the 
reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons has led to 
high rates of growth in construction and agriculture , as much of the 
country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27 -year 
long civil war (TWF, 2013).  
In carrying out the reconstruction process, the Angolan government has 
sourced for billions of dollars in credit lines from China, Brazil, Portugal, 
Germany, Spain, and the European Union (EU) to rebuild the country’s 
public infrastructure. As a result of the dependence on these foreign 
credits, lower prices for oil and diamonds among other reasons, the 
country’s economic growth was affected by the rece nt global recession. In 
2009, Angola witnessed a contraction in GDP and many construction 
projects were suspended because of an accrued nine billion US Dollars ($9 
billion) in arrears to foreign construction companies when government 
revenue fell in 2008 and 2009 (TWF, 2011).  
The government also abandoned its currency peg in 2009, and 
subsequently signed onto an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand -By 
Arrangement loan of $1.4 billion to rebuild international reserves (TWF, 
2013). Angola’s inflation  rate, which fell from a massive 325% in 2000 to 
14% in 2010 and 10% in 2012, has remained a modest double digit figure 
and the country’s currency – Kwanza, depreciated again in 2010 (TWF, 
2011) . The modest inflation rate, depreciated currency and rising oil 
prices are expected to drive the economic growth. However, the 
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dependence on the energy sector and corruption are some of the major 
challenges that may affect the expected economic growth. 
(iii) Ecuador 
Ecuador is also heavily dependent on the energy sector as it s petroleum 
exports have contributed over half of the country's total export earnings 
within the last five years. In recent years, crude oil exports have 
accounted for about 40% of the government revenues. With Ecuador’s 
GDP contracting by approximately 5% in 1999, the country suffered a 
severe economic crisis which led to  an increase in poverty level, collapse 
of the financial sector and a default on its external debt. As a response to 
the economic crisis, Ecuador adopted the US Dollar as its legal tender and 
the government introduced a series of structural reforms. The 
Dollarization of the Ecuador economy in 2000, high oil prices, remittances, 
and increased non-traditional exports stabilized the economy, and 
stimulated positive growth in the following year s (TWF, 2012). 
Subsequently, the country’s economy witnessed an average of 5.2% 
growth per year from 2001 to 2005, the highest five -year average in 25 
years (TWF, 2008).  
This economic turn-around was followed by continuous positive economic 
growths as a result of the rising oil prices and the improving public sector 
investments. According to TWF (2011), in December 2008 Ecuador 
defaulted on its sovereign debt of approximately US$3.2 billion, which 
represented about 80% of Ecuador's private external debt. A lthough, the 
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country bought back 91% of its external debt defaults, its economy is 
currently facing lethargic reactions from private investors. In 2009, this 
development led to a GDP contraction of 0.4% due to uncertainty of the 
government policies, global  financial crisis and sharp declines in global 
crude oil prices and remittance flows. However, the government estimates 
indicated a 3.3% economic growth rate in 2010 and 8% in 2011 before 
dropping to 4% in 2012.  
(iv) Iran 
Iran’s economy is significantly dependent on crude oil exports and state 
controlled. Petroleum exports account for almost 90% of the government’s 
revenues and about 85% of the total exports. The system of governance in 
the country has discouraged major private sector activities and existing 
private sector activities are usually small -scale in nature.   
Apart from the governance related structural rigidities that have 
undermined the potential for substantive economic growth, the increasing 
international sanctions on Iran have also affected the e conomy adversely. 
Economic issues like subsidies, price control and product rationing among 
other issues are the drivers of the thriving informal market activities in 
Iran. The country’s policy to reduce subsidies on food and energy, which 
has not been implemented for fear of public disenchantment and the 
rising inflation rate, is meant to introduce a system of wealth re -
distribution in favour of the lower class.  
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The increased petroleum exports revenue as a result of the rising crude oil 
prices has cushioned the impacts of the recent international sanctions on 
Iran. Apart from the sanctions, the major economic challenges facing Iran 
are the rising double digit unemployment and underemployment (TWF, 
2013).  
(v) Iraq 
With an improving security environment and a r econstruction boom, Iraq’s 
economy has attracted tremendous foreign investments. The ongoing 
economic activities, particularly in the energy, construction, and retail 
sectors have re-positioned Iraq on a near steady pace. However, 
expectations of the government’s introduction of major policy reforms on 
continued development of Iraq's massive oil reserves have stalled the 
entrance of more foreign investors. The foreign investors are also 
discouraged by the regulatory impediments and difficulties in acquiring  
land for projects. The country’s economy is dominated by the energy 
sector, especially crude oil, which accounts for over 85% of total exports, 
90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. As the 
civil crisis is gradually coming to an e nd, the crude oil export earnings and 
government revenues have bounced back to pre-crisis era levels, along 
with increasing global oil prices.  
Iraq’s 2011 budget projected a crude oil exports quota of 2.4 million 
barrels per day and 2.6 million barrels a day in 2012, due to the return 
and influx of new international oil companies. The country is keen on 
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boosting economic growth and is making modest progress in this regard. 
Recently, Baghdad has encouraged the improvement of the institutions 
needed to implement the ongoing reforms and economic policy. According 
to TWF (2011), Baghdad signed a new agreement with both the IMF and 
World Bank in 2010 for conditional aid programs that will help strengthen 
Iraq's economic institutions. With a reform-oriented government, the 
country is seeking to pass legislations as well to strengthen the economy. 
The proposed legislations would include laws to initiate a modern legal 
framework for the energy sector and a proactive mechanism to divide oil 
revenues equitably in the country. Iraq will need to upgrade its oil 
processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable the recent deals 
and contracts with major oil companies to stimulate the expansion of its 
oil revenues.  
The government’s strategy is to boost additional fo reign investments in 
the economy by amending the National Investment Law (NIL) to redefine 
the multiple international trade and investment negotiations as well as 
potential participation in joint ventures with state -owned enterprises 
(TWF, 2011). At the local level, the provincial councils are also using the 
local budgets to encourage and aid investments but these investments are 
stifled by inadequate infrastructure, insufficient essential services, 
widespread corruption, and obsolete commercial laws and re gulations. 
These structural rigidities have continued to constrain the growth of 
private sector especially the non-energy sectors. The country’s exchange 
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rate controlled by the Central Bank has been effectively held at 
approximately 1,170 Iraqi Dinar per US Dollar since January 2009 and 
1,166 Iraqi Dinar per US Dollar in 2012 (TWF, 2013). The level of inflation 
in Iraq has decreased consistently since 2006 as a result of the improved 
security situation. Apart from the structural rigidities mentioned above, 
the government would have to overcome the issues of unemployment and 
improve the diversification of the economy in order to translate the 
macroeconomic gains into improved lives for the citizenry.  
(vi) Kuwait 
Geographically, Kuwait is small and runs a relative ly open economy. With 
a crude oil reserve of about 102 billion barrels - about 7% of world 
reserves, the country’s economy is driven by the petroleum sector. Crude 
oil relatively accounts for about 50% of the GDP, 95% of total exports, and 
95% of the government’s revenue. According to TWF (2011), the Kuwaiti 
government is committed to increasing oil production to 4 million barrels 
per day by 2020. The economy of Kuwait has witnessed positive growths in 
2010 due to the rise in oil prices. The increased earni ngs from crude oil 
exports have been stimulating the government consumption and economic 
growth. In 2010, Kuwait experienced about 20% rise in government budget 
revenues. Kuwaiti government has developed programmes to diversify its 
economy but has faced challenges from the poor business climate and the 
acrimonious relationship between the Legislative and the Executive arms 
of government, and the favourable positive fiscal situation over the years. 
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Although, these challenges have affected the economic reform s adversely, 
the government has renewed focus on the need to diversify the economy 
by passing a privatization bill that allows the government to sell assets to 
private investors, and in January, 2011 passed an economic development 
plan that pledges to spend up to $130 billion towards diversification 
within five years (TWF, 2011).  
The Kuwaiti government has attracted more investment recently and is 
focused on stimulating the private sector participation in the economy. 
However, the ambitious nature of the programme would require more 
government expenditures.  
(vii) Libya 
The Libyan economy is heavily dependent on petroleum exports. Crude oil 
exports revenues contribute about 95% of export s earnings, 80% of the 
country’s GDP, and 99% of government revenues. In 2009 , Libya witnessed 
a decline in petroleum income and a constrained economic growth due to 
the sharp decline in global oil prices. Libya has one of the highest per 
capita GDPs in Africa as a result of the small size of the population and the 
significant revenue from crude oil. Although, Libya has a huge crude oil 
revenue base, the lower class of the population are not benefitting from 
this largesse. The country’s efforts to stimulate further economic growth 
by introducing economic reforms have been relatively  successful before 
the Arab Spring protests that ended Gaddafi’s rule. The economic reforms 
were seen as part of a broader national campaign to reintegrate the 
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country into the international fold (TWF, 2011). With the UN sanctions 
lifted in 2003 and Libya’s resolve to abandon programmes to build 
weapons of mass destruction, the government concentrated on reinforcing 
the economic reforms. In 2006, all sanctions on Libya were removed, 
enhancing Libya’s foreign direct investment, especially in the energy 
sector. 
Before the recent revolution that started as a result of the Arab Spring in 
2011, the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) had set a goal of nearly 
doubling oil production to 3 million barrel per day by 2012. With the 
outcome of the Arab Spring, Libya’s Transitional government faces a long 
road ahead in rebuilding the country and liberalizing the socialist -oriented 
economy. The non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which 
account for more than 20% of GDP, are expected to expand from 
processing mostly agricultural products to include the production of 
petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminium. The transition to a more 
market based economy would suffer some setback but already designed 
steps like applying for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) me mbership, 
reducing some subsidies, and announcing plans for privatization alongside 
the reconstruction process would herald the foundation for a transition to 
a more market-based economy.  
Libya is expected to continue importing about 80% of its food due t o the 
unfavourable climatic conditions and poor soils which have severely 
limited agricultural output.  
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(viii) Nigeria 
Political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor 
macroeconomic management are the likely features to describe the 
Nigerian economy for the better part of the last three decades. However, 
since the transition from military to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has 
witnessed immense economic growth due to the aggressive pursuit of 
diverse economic reforms. Like other OPEC members, Nigeria's economy is 
dependent on the capital-intensive oil sector, which accounts for about 
95% of its foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of its budgetary 
revenues. Nigeria received a favourable debt  restructuring deal from the 
Paris Club and a $1 billion credit from the IMF, following the signing of an 
IMF stand-by agreement in 2000 (TWF, 2011). According to TWF (2011), 
Nigeria pulled out of this IMF program in 2002, after failing to meet 
spending and exchange rate targets, making it ineligible for additional 
debt forgiveness from the Paris Club.  
However, the country won the Paris Club approval for a debt -relief deal 
that eliminated $18 billion of debt in exchange for $12 billion in payments 
- a total package worth $30 billion of Nigeria's total $37 billion external 
debt (TWF, 2011). In a bid to implement its market -oriented reforms urged 
by the IMF, the government introduced economic reforms such as 
modernizing the banking system, curbing inflation by blocking excessive 
wage demands, and resolving regional disputes over the distribution of 
earnings from the oil industry. The government is also on the brink of 
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removing the petroleum subsidy but faces nationwide opposition led by 
the labour unions.  
Nigeria’s GDP has remained strong since 2007 primarily  because of 
increased oil exports and high global crude oil prices, and the enhanced 
infrastructural development in the ongoing economic reforms. In Nigeria, 
the lack of adequate infrastructure is the main impediment to economic 
growth. In recognition of this problem, the government has focused on 
developing the power sector blueprint that includes privatization of the 
state-run electricity generation and distribution facilities. While the 
government is developing infrastructure, it is also working to stren gthen 
the financial sector which was affected by the recent global financial and 
economic crisis, and working towards developing stronger public -private 
partnerships in all sectors of the economy, especially the agricultural 
sector.  
(ix) Qatar 
Qatar has the highest per-capita income ahead of Liechtenstein and one of 
the countries with the lowest unemployment rate (TWF, 2011). The 
country has been able to create wealth among its citizenry with the 
massive revenues from oil and gas exports. The oil and gas sector 
currently accounts for more than 50% of GDP, about 85% of export 
earnings, and 70% of government incomes (TWF, 2013). In 2010 , Qatar had 
the world's highest economic growth rate despite the global financial 
crisis and fluctuating crude oil prices. During the global financial crisis, 
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Qatari government sought to protect the local banking sector with direct 
investments into domestic banks (TWF, 2013). This ensured the protection 
of the country’s economy from the crisis. Qatar’s GDP has largely 
benefitted from the increase in global oil prices and the rising natural gas 
exports. The government’s focus is on developing the country’s non -
associated natural gas reserves and stimulating private and foreign 
investments in the non-energy sectors. With oil reserves of  about 25 
billion barrels and natural gas reserves of over 25 trillion cubic meters - 
about 14% of the world’s total gas reserves and third largest in the world, 
it is expected that Qatar’s economy will continue to grow with output at 
current levels for the next 57 years (TWF, 2011). Qatar’s economy is also 
expected to benefit from the likely constructions of large -scale 
infrastructure projects as a result of the country’s successful 2022 world 
cup bid. 
(x) Saudi Arabia 
Currently, Saudi Arabia has a crude oil dependent economy with strong 
government controls over major economic activities (TWF, 2011). The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of crude oil and possesses 
about 17% of the world's proven crude oil reserves. The country is a major 
player in OPEC and the petroleum sector accounts for about 80% of the 
budget revenues, 45% of GDP, and approximately 90% of export earnings 
(TWF, 2013). In order to diversify its economy and create jobs for its 
citizenry, Saudi Arabia is encouraging private sector growth and focusing 
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on power generation, telecommunications, natural gas exploration , and 
development of the petrochemical sectors.  
The Saudi government has begun the establishment of six "economic 
cities" in different regions of the country to stimulate foreign investment 
and has a development plan that sees the country spending about $373 
billion between 2010 and 2014 on social development and infrastructure 
projects to advance Saudi Arabia's economic development. Although, it 
employs over five million foreign workers in the oil and service sectors of 
the economy, unemployment of its nationals has become a major concern 
to the government. The government’s policy thrust is to create 
employment for its large youth population, which generally lacks the 
education and technical skills the private sector requires (TWF, 2011).  
(xi) United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
According to TWF (2011), the UAE has an open economy with a high per 
capita income and a sizable annual trade surplus. The UAE’s economy is 
also petroleum-based but recently, the government’s efforts at 
diversifying the economy have reduced the portion of GDP that is based 
on oil and gas output to 25%. The UAE has undergone a profound 
transformation over the last three decades, from an impoverished region 
of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of 
living since the discovery of oil in the country (TWF, 2011). In a bid to 
consolidate on its recent developmental strides, the UAE government has 
renewed its interest on job creation and infrastructure expansion which 
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will open up utilities for more participation of the private sector. To 
further enhance the private sector involvement in the country’s economy, 
the government signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) and agreed to undertake negotiations toward a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with Washington. In the same vein, the country's Free 
Trade Zones (FTZ) offer 100% foreign ownership and zero taxes as a means 
to help attract foreign investors (TWF, 2013).  
The country witnessed some financial challenges during the global 
financial crisis due to tight international credit and deflated asset prices. 
The global financial crisis led to a contracted economic growth in 2009 and 
2010. However, since late 2010 and early 2011, the UAE ec onomy began a 
gradual rebound as a result of the financial boost that the Dubai 
Investment firm (a real estate interest) received from the Abu Dhabi 
emirate and the rising crude oil prices.  
The economy’s slow rebound is expected to continue but would face  some 
structural challenges. These structural challenges are continuous 
dependence on oil, dominance of the labour force by expatriates and 
growing inflation rates. According to TWF (2011), the UAE's government is 
expected to focus on the diversification of the economy and creating jobs 
and more opportunities for its citizenry through increased private sector 
employment and improved education  system. 
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(xii) Venezuela 
The petroleum sector accounts for about 95% of export earnings, 55% of 
the government’s budget revenues, and around 30% of GDP in Venezuela 
(TWF, 2011). The country is highly dependent on crude oil revenues and 
has been recovering from a contraction in economic growth due to the 
sharp declines in oil prices in 2009. Apart from the decline in oil pric es in 
2009, the strong government control of the system has some economic 
consequences. 
The rising crude oil prices in recent years combining with the increase in 
minimum wage and improved access to domestic credit led to a 
consumption boom, especially nat ional imports in Venezuela. The 
consumption boom triggered off high rates of inflation, rising to 32% in 
2008 and dropped to 30% in 2010, 26% in 2011 and 21% in 2012 (TWF, 
2013). Recently, Venezuela’s attempt to increase the government's control 
of the economy by nationalizing firms in the different sectors of the 
economy has affected the private investment environment, reduced 
productive capacity, and slowed non-petroleum exports. In January 2011, 
the government devalued the country’s currency –  the Bolivar, after 
twelve months of an earlier devaluation and introduction of a parallel 
foreign exchange rate market. The socialist state has continued to witness 
different level of intervention and full participation by the government in 
the different sectors of the economy. There are various laws passed 
recently by the Legislature before the death of the country’s socialist 
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leader, Hugo Chavez, to enforce some unorthodox economic policies. The 
country is currently grappling with the challenges of macroeconomic 
imbalances and varying sectoral crisis as a result of the prevailing 
economic policies. These economic crisis have led to a budget deficit of 
17% of the GDP in 2012 and a public debt that has risen to 49% of the GDP 
in 2012 as well (TWF, 2013).  
2.1.1 OPEC’S  Crude  Oil Exports and Economic Dependence 
OPEC members’ exports are dominated by oil and gas. The share of crude 
oil in OPEC’s total exports has been massive since the 1970s as compared 
to natural gas, which became a significant OPEC export in the late 1990s. 
Table 1 below shows OPEC’s total exports and petroleum exports values in 
2010. Among the OPEC member states, Iraq has the highest share of 
petroleum exports in its total export value at 98% followed by Angola at 
96% and the least is UAE at 37%. 
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Table 1: OPEC’s Crude Oil Exports  (Source: OPEC Annual Statistics Bulletin 2011)  
OPEC 
Countries 
Value of 
Crude Oil 
Exports 
(Bn$) 
Value of 
Exports 
(Bn$) 
Share of Crude Oil exports 
in OPEC’s total Export 
value (%) 
ALGERIA 38.30 57.8 66 
ANGOLA 47.24 49.2 96 
ECUADOR 9.65 17.37 56 
IRAN 71.57 83.79 85 
IRAQ 51.15 52.08 98 
KUWAIT 61.67 65.98 93 
LIBYA 41.87 46.31 90 
NIGERIA 61.80 70.58 88 
QATAR 29.28 72.05 40 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
196.19 253.34 77 
UAE 74.03 198.36 37 
VENEZUELA 62.32 65.79 95 
The revenues of OPEC member states are majorly from crude oil export s’ 
income . Although, it varies, crude oil exports’ income account s for over 
95% of the government revenues of most OPEC members. In 2010, the 
shares of energy exports’ revenue in the country -level GDP for OPEC 
members are shown below:   
 
Table 2: OPEC’s Crude Oil exports share in the GDP (Source: OPEC Annual 
Statistics Bulletin 2011)  
OPEC 
Members 
Value of Oil 
Exports (Bn$) 
GDP 
(Bn$) 
Share of Oil Exports in 
OPEC’s GDP (%)  
ALGERIA 38.30 162.92 24 
ANGOLA 47.24 85.31 55 
ECUADOR 9.65 57.00 17 
IRAN 71.57 357.22 20 
IRAQ 51.15 125.90 41 
KUWAIT 61.67 131.32 47 
LIBYA 41.87 74.23 56 
NIGERIA 61.80 193.67 32 
QATAR 29.28 128.59 23 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
196.19 443.69 
44 
UAE 74.03 269.10 28 
VENEZUELA 62.32 295.96 21 
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From table 2 above, the contribution of crude oil exports to the OPEC GDP 
at country-level varies. Libya has the highest level of dependence at 56% 
while Ecuador has the least level of dependence at 17%.  
The share of crude oil exports in the total OPEC exports and the crude oil 
export revenue per country as well as the contribution to the GDP indicate 
that OPEC member states are significantly dependent on crude oil exports. 
Therefore, these countries are expected to be vulnerable to fall in GDP, 
revenues and per capita income when the incomes from crude oil exports 
decline. With OPEC’s dependence on crude oil exports and the envisaged 
vulnerability to the global crude oil price shocks , it becomes expedient for 
OPEC to be considered in developing, designing and implem enting global 
climate change mitigation policies and measures. It is expected that the 
existing climate change mitigation policies and measures would further 
undermine the ability of OPEC to influence the global energy market as 
OPEC market share in the global supply of crude oil is expected to decline 
as well. 
2.2 Climate Change Mitigation and Crude Oil Importing Countries  
The countries listed in the UNFCCC Annex 1 document represent about 24 
countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperat ion 
and Development (OECD), therefore, this paper focuses on OECD countries 
in describing the crude oil importing countries or Annex 1 countries.  
OECD countries account for about 60% of the global crude oil 
consumptions and are major players in the interna tional oil market. With 
consumption in other parts of the world like China and India growing, this 
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figure may drop but OECD member states would still be the major 
importers of crude oil. Table 3 below shows the share of OPEC’s crude oil 
supplies in the world crude oil imports by OECD countries.   
 
Table 3: OPEC’s Crude Oil supplies share in OECD countries (Source: OPEC 
Annual Statistics Bulletin 2011; EIA, 2012)  
Countries 2010 OPEC 
Crude Oil 
Supplies(1,000 
b/d) 
2010 Total 
World 
Crude Oil 
Imports 
Share of 
OPEC’s 
Exports 
(%) 
North America 5,100 9,953.4 51.2 
Europe 3,068 11,718.6 26.2 
Asia and Pacific 11,546 17,163.0 67.3* 
Latin America 661 2,166.1 30.5 
Africa and 
Middle East 
 
694 
 
1,473.1 
 
47.1 
Total World 23,112 42,474.2 54.4 
    
*including Japan which is an OECD country 
 
With these figures in table 3 above and the significant stake these OECD 
countries control on the demand side of the global crude oil market, a 
reduction in consumption of and demand for crude oil by OECD countries 
will have significant economic impacts on the crude oil exporting 
countries.  
Since crude oil consumption has been universally recognised as one of the 
most significant sources of carbon emissions in the world, various policies 
and measures are adopted to curb crude oil relat ed carbon emissions. 
Among these measures, adoption of technologies to enhance energy 
efficiency has been most popular and could be more effective. The 
application of energy efficiency oriented technologies that enhance 
switching from crude oil consumption to natural gas or to other low 
emission sources and renewable energy sources are currently in use in 
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OECD countries while advanced technologies such as the carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) are being considered as well . According to the EU in a 
European Commission’s communication titled ‘Winning the battle against 
Climate Change ’, the importance of a country-level portfolio of climate 
change policies and energy efficiency related technologies is emphasized.  
Apart from climate change mitigation, security of  energy supply is also as 
a chief concern in OECD energy equation as presently demonstrated by the 
OECD countries’ energy policies. In the long term, fossil energy depletion 
based on the oil peak theory and the concentration of the reserves and 
production of fossil energy resources in politically unstable regions of the 
world (TWF, 2010) are expected to affect the security of energy supply. 
While the quota of fossil fuels in the energy supply portfolio may affect 
the possibilities of carbon emissions in the  short term, policies for long 
term supply security will however seek to reduce the consumption of 
imported crude oil and encourage low carbon energy sources in the OECD 
countries.  
Several studies have listed some energy efficiency technologies that will 
simultaneously contribute to curbing greenhouse gas emissions (Berk et al 
2006, Bardley and Lefevre 2006). According to the IEA (2006), these 
adopted technologies and their contribution to the global greenhouse 
gases emissions reduction by 2050 are as follows;  
Improved energy efficiency measures will account for about 31 -53% 
greenhouse gases  emissions reduction, while carbon capture and storage 
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will account for about 20-28% of greenhouse gases emissions reduction, 
fuel switching will account for about 11-16% greenhouse gases emissions 
reduction, renewable energy sources will account for about 16% 
greenhouse gases emissions reduction, nuclear energy will account for 
about 2-10% greenhouse gases emissions reduction and biofuels in the 
transportation sector will account for about 6% greenhouse gases 
emissions reduction.  
With a massive crude oil demand portfolio by OECD members as shown 
above, the OECD countries, are keen to implement their climate change 
mitigation policies like the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gases emissions 
reduction targets with some countries raising the bar above the original 
Kyoto Protocol’s allocated targets.  
2.2.1 Climate Change Mitigation: the Kyoto Protocol’s Influence  
At the third session of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in 
1997 at Kyoto – Japan, greenhouse gases emissions reduction targets were 
agreed for OECD member states (i .e. the annex 1 countries) from 2008 –  
2012 as the first commitment period  (Kyoto Protocol’s targets have been 
extended to a second commitment period, 2013 – 2020, while efforts are 
made to achieve a universal and all inclusive climate change mitigation 
agreement). Based on the reference year –  1990, it was agreed that the US 
reduction target would be 7%, the EU reduction target would be 8% and 
Japan’s reduction target would be 6%. Hence, the Kyoto Protocol 
established these mandatory and enforceable targets for greenhouse 
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gases emissions reduction. The general emissions target for the 
participating countries range from –8% to +10% of 1990 levels and the 
overall reduction goal is 5% below the 1990 level from 2008 to 2012  
(UNFCCC, 2013a).  The Kyoto Protocol is hinged on three greenhouse gases 
emissions reduction mechanisms . These mechanisms are the joint 
implementation mechanism, clean development mechanism and emissions 
trading mechanism. The joint implementation mechanism involves one 
country receiving emissions reduction credits for implementing projects 
that reduce emissions or sequester carbon in another country that has an 
emission limit. For example,  The Netherlands is implementing carbon 
(CH4) capture projects in Germany (UNFCCC, 2013b). The clean 
development mechanism allows countries with emission limits (majorly 
Annex 1 countries) to receive greenhouse gases emissions reduction 
credits for implementing projects that reduce emissions or sequester 
carbon in another country that does not have an emission limit. For 
example, Finland is receiving credits for developing biomass -based power 
plants in India and Italy is receiving credits for developing a n atural gas 
based Independent Power Plant (IPP) project in Nigeria  (UNFCCC, 2013c). 
The emissions trading mechanism distributes permits equal to an allowed 
level of emissions to each country. The countries or parties with emissions 
level below their specified allowances are expected to dispose off their 
excess permits through sales to other countries or parties that are 
emitting above or exceeded their emissions allowance  (UNFCCC, 2013d). 
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2.2.2 Climate Change Mitigation Strategies  
In OECD countries, especially the major crude oil consumers, there are 
strategic plans and policies to mitigate climate change and chief among 
these plans is the reduction of fossil energy consumption. While it is 
expected that this strategy - reduction of fossil fuel consumption, will lead 
to a significant fall in demand for OPEC crude oil exports, there are other 
strategies that may not affect the demand for petroleum products . Some 
of the strategies adopted by the OECD to reduce greenhouse gases 
emissions are the Market-Based Strategies and the regulatory strategies.  
The market-based strategies or instruments include tradable carbon 
permits, emissions taxes and subsidies for renewable fuels. Most OECD 
countries have adopted the tradable carbon permit system as a means to 
achieve their greenhouse gases emissions reduction targets. The tradable 
carbon permits system earlier mentioned as one the Kyoto Protocol’s 
mechanisms, allows a country or party to continue with some level of 
emissions which are specifically distributed by the country o r party. 
Tradable emissions permits are presently traded on the Chicago and 
European Climate Exchanges and have the potential to reduce emissions in 
a cost-effective way. Tradable permits system emphasises on energy 
efficiency and eventual decline in fossi l energy consumption levels in the 
OECD countries. Emissions taxes are introduced in different sectors of the 
economy for the emissions of greenhouse gases above certain atmospheric 
level. The most effective sector has been the transportation sector. This 
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approach has a multiplier effect which lead to the reduction of fossil 
energy consumption.  
Subsidies on the production of renewable energy are used to reduce the 
impacts of the costs of renewable energy on the consumers while 
encouraging them to reduce their consumption of fossil energy.  
The regulatory strategies are the non-market approaches adopted by some 
OECD countries in order to achieve their greenhouse gases emissions 
reduction targets. They include technology and performance standards, 
direct government investments, product bans, and non-tradable permits. 
For instance, in the US, the household appliance performance standards 
and the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for vehicles, 
administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admi nistration 
(NHTSA) fall into this category. Recently, the US environmental protection 
agency (EPA) and the NHTSA  proposed a joint rule to combine the EPA’s 
greenhouse gases emissions standards and CAFE’s standards that require 
vehicles to reduce their average carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions level to 
250 grams of CO2 per mile or 35.5 miles per gallon. This proposal was 
sequel to 2007 ruling by the US Supreme Court, that the environmental 
protection agency (EPA) can regulate CO2 emissions from mobile sources 
under the clean air act. As a major importer of oil and gas among the 
OECD member states, it is important to understand the US government’s 
approach to reducing greenhouse gases emissions.  
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3. OPEC and the Kyoto Protocol Debate 
The debates and deliberations for the measures and policies with which to 
achieve the greenhouse gases reduction targets agreed in Kyoto and the 
self-imposed targets have been going on over the years. The fossil based 
energy exporters have been sticking to Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC in their 
quest to mitigate or alleviate the impact of the climate change mitigation 
on their economies. Among these countries, OPEC, comprising of twelve 
crude oil exporting countries, has been leading this debate. Though OPEC 
was not chosen to lead this group but its organised nature, history and the 
economic dependence of its member states on fossil energy exports have 
made their voice louder than non-OPEC exporting countries (Barnett et al 
2004).  
OPEC has been very influential in this regard. The UNFCCC ar ticle 4.8 
states that; in the implementation of policies (and measures) aiming at a 
reduction of greenhouse gases emissions, the Parties shall give full 
considerations to actions that are necessary under the Convention, 
including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of 
technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing 
country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or 
the impact of the implementation of the response measures, especially on 
small island countries;  countries with low-lying coastal areas; countries 
with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas, and areas liable to forest 
decay; countries with areas prone to natural disasters; countries with 
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areas liable to drought and desertification; countries with areas of high 
urban atmospheric pollution; countries with areas with fragile ecosystem, 
including mountainous ecosystems; countries whose economies are highly 
dependent on income generated from the production, processing and 
export and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-
intensively products; and land-locked and transit countries 
OPEC members have continuously emphasised with reference to Article 
4.8 that countries implementing their greenhouse gases emission 
reduction policies, especially OECD countries, should take note of the 
adverse impacts of their actions on the oil and gas revenues of its member 
states. This has made OPEC members to be cautious about the global 
efforts to implement climate change mitigation policies es pecially the 
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions reduction targets.  
However, some non-Annex 1 countries in the same category with OPEC 
have embraced the efforts towards the implementation of climate change 
mitigation policies. This group of non-Annex 1 countries see the efforts to 
mitigate climate change as an opportunity to enhance the efficiency of 
their energy sectors and enhance positive economic growth. Because of 
this hindsight, they have adopted a more positive attitude and approach 
towards climate change mitigation measures. With some countries having 
a different interest from OPEC, the non-Annex 1 countries as a whole have 
not been able to form a coherent group on climate negotiations.  
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4. Conclusions 
This section reviewed the motivation for the study, the str uctures of 
OPEC’s economies with reference to their dependence on fossil energy 
exports revenues, climate change mitigation strategies and why the OECD 
countries that are Annex 1 countries are keen on reducing their fossil fuel 
consumptions as a means to reducing greenhouse gases emissions. The 
Kyoto Protocol’s influence as a supplement to the UNFCCC and major 
driver of global climate change mitigation has made it the basis of all 
climate negotiations. While OPEC members seek to continue to 
legitimately make a case for the economies of the fossil energy exporting 
countries, the OECD countries have developed strategies to meet their 
greenhouse gases emissions reduction targets in line with the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
This section has also shown the relationship betw een OPEC and climate 
change mitigations on the one hand and OECD and climate change 
mitigations on the other hand. However, this section is based on 
qualitative analysis and it is recommended that a quantitative analysis be 
carried out to determine the impacts of climate change mitigation 
strategies on OPEC economies.  
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5. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is a four section study that covers the scope of work and 
attempts to answer the research questions raised above.  Following the 
motivation for the thesis and structures of OPEC economies in this section 
is the paper on “the impacts of climate change mitigation on crude oil 
prices” in section two, while the paper on “the impacts of crude oil prices 
on OPEC economies” comes up in section three and finally,  the paper on 
“the analysis of the measure of OPEC’s oil and gas demand security risk” is 
presented in section four.  
The paper on the impacts of climate change mitigation on crude oil prices 
empirically investigates how climate change mitigation affects cr ude oil 
prices while using carbon intensity as the indicator for climate change 
mitigation. The relationship between crude oil prices and carbon intensity 
is estimated using an Arellano and Bond GMM dynamic panel model. This 
study undertakes a regional-level analysis because of the geographical 
similarities among the countries in a region. Regions considered for the 
study are Africa, Asia and Oceania, Central and South America, the EU, the 
Middle East and North America. Results show that there is a positive  
relationship between crude oil prices and carbon intensity, and a 1% 
change in carbon intensity is expected to cause about 1.6% change in 
crude oil prices in the short run and 8.416% change in crude oil prices in 
the long run while the speed of adjustment  is 19%. 
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The paper on the impacts of crude oil prices on OPEC economies 
investigates the relationship between OPEC’s economic growth and crude 
oil prices. The relationship between economic growth and crude oil prices 
has received enormous attention in the literature. However, there are 
diverse views about the causality and nature of this relationship. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate how economic growths in crude oil 
exporting countries are affected by changes in global crude oil prices using 
a panel vector auto regression (VAR) approach. This paper examines the 
response of economic growths in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) member states to changes in crude oil prices. Findings in 
this paper show that changes in crude oil  prices in the period under 
considerations positively and significantly affect economic growths in 
OPEC member states. The findings emphasise the role of economic policies 
in insulating OPEC economies and other oil exporting countries from 
changes in crude oil prices. 
With the establishment of empirical evidence that climate change 
mitigation affects crude oil price and that there is a transmission of this 
effect on OPEC economies, the last paper on “the analysis of the measure 
of OPEC’s oil and gas demand security risk” determines the risk index of 
OPEC members as a result of decline in crude oil and gas demand. One of 
the policy objectives of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) is the security of the crude oil exports of its members. A chieving 
this objective has become imperative with the projected decline in the 
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global crude oil demand as a result of the looming global warming 
concerns. This paper focuses on determining the external crude oil 
demand risk of OPEC member states. The stud y introduces two indexes 
designed to evaluate the short term risks associated with the external 
demand of OPEC crude oil and gas exports and the contribution of the 
member states to the OPEC risk exposure.  The first index, Risky External 
Energy Demand (REED), indicates the level of energy export demand risk 
for the OPEC member states. It combines measures of export dependence, 
economic dependence, monopsony risk and transportation risk. The 
second index, Contribution to OPEC Risks Exposure (CORE), indicates the 
individual contribution of the OPEC members to the OPEC energy export 
demand risk exposure. This study utilises the disaggregated approach to 
measuring energy security risks for crude oil and gas and involves a 
country level analysis. With the disaggregated approach, the study shows 
that OPEC’s energy export demand security risk exposures differ across 
energy types.  
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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates how climate change mitigation affects 
crude oil prices while using carbon intensity as the indicator for climate 
change mitigation. The relationship between crude oil prices and car bon 
intensity is estimated using an Arellano and Bond GMM dynamic panel 
model. This study undertakes a regional -level analysis because of the 
geographical similarities among the countries in a region. Regions 
considered for the study are Africa, Asia and O ceania, Central and South 
America, the EU, the Middle East and North America. Results show that 
there is a positive relationship between crude oil prices and carbon 
intensity, and a1% change in carbon intensity is expected to cause about 
1.6% change in crude oil prices in the short run and 8.4% change in crude 
oil prices in the long run while the speed of adjustment is 1 9%. 
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1. Introduction 
Many factors influence the prices of crude oil globally and among these 
factors are supply and demand activities (Bacon, 1991; Dees et al., 2007; 
Mitchell, 2006), market speculations (Haigh et al. 2005 and Kogan et al. 
2003), taxes (OPEC, 2012), war and political instability (Ste vens and 
Hulbert, 2012). These factors have been empirically shown to have 
significant effects on crude oil prices (Fattouh, 2007; King et al, 2012). The 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as the major global 
crude oil producers and suppl iers, has been concerned about these factors 
especially the ones, which from their point of view have adverse effects 
on the prices of crude oil (OPEC, 2010).  
Recently, the global energy industry’s focus has shifted to the concern 
about the carbon contents of fossil based energy sources especially with 
the global spotlight on carbon emissions reduction (IPIECA, 2007). This 
concern and the extension of Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period to 2020 
(i.e. the second commitment period 2013 –  2020) have thrown up a major 
economic challenge for countries that are dependent on crude oil export 
revenues especially OPEC (OPEC, 2010). One of the issues related to this 
new economic threat perceived by OPEC is the pricing of crude oil under 
the new climate regime(s). To shed more light on this issue, this paper 
attempts to determine the relationship between crude oil prices and 
climate change mitigation activity.  
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To carry out the required investigation in this paper, climate change 
mitigation activity is represented by a p roxy indicator. This study opts for 
a proxy indicator in order to capture the climate change mitigation 
activities that have the tendency to impact on crude oil consumption 
and/or production. The proxy indicator for climate change mitigation 
chosen for this study is carbon intensity which shows the level of carbon 
utilisation in the economy (Kaya, 1990, Rogner et al, 2007; UN, 2008). 
Carbon intensity is also preferred as a proxy indicator because it is derived 
from all sectors of the economy and captures al l carbon-related climate 
mitigation effects whether in the short term or long term and there are 
data on carbon intensity levels that cover the period under consideration 
(Sun, 1998; Sun and Ang, 2000; Helme and Leining, 2003). The carbon 
intensity values are derived at consumption level instead of production 
level because of the different regions/countries considered by the model. 
Measurement of carbon intensity at production levels may lead to double 
counting as some intermediate products exported to othe r countries will 
be taken into account in both the exporting and importing countries. 
However, measurement of carbon intensity at consumption level 
encourages the transfer of emission from country or region of production 
to the country or region of consumption where inter-country or inter-
regional trades exist. Other indicators considered initially are greenhouse 
gases emissions and per capita emissions (WRI, 2013) but carbon intensity 
is more compatible to the model used for this study. While greenhouse 
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gases emissions indicator considers all the gases emitted, carbon intensity 
considers only CO2 related emissions. On the other hand, per capita 
emissions indicator considers total emissions per person while carbon 
intensity considers total emissions per econ omic output. The a priori  and 
theoretical assumption is that, crude oil consumption is affected when 
carbon reduction strategies such as carbon taxes are introduced to reduce 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (IPCC, 2007; Barnett et al 2004). This paper 
also addresses how fast, crude oil prices change when carbon intensity 
changes.  
To estimate the relationship between crude oil prices and carbon intensity 
levels including the short and long run effects, and the speed of 
adjustment, this paper explores the Are llano-Bond (AB) dynamic panel 
model (Arellano and Bond, 1991).The results of this study show a positive 
relationship between crude oil prices and carbon intensity suggesting that 
there is a relationship between crude oil prices and climate change 
mitigation activity in the regions under consideration in the short run and 
long run respectively.  
This paper is presented in five sections. The following section looks at the 
structure of the crude oil market,  related studies in the literature and the 
sources and nature of the data used for the study. Section three explores 
the methodology of the study and section four addresses the presentation 
and discussion of the results. Section five covers the conclusion and policy 
implications of the study’s outcome.  
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2. Literature Review and Background to the Study 
2.1 The Structure of the Crude Oil Market  
The global crude oil market has been described theoretically as an 
oligopolistic market (Mileva and Siegfried, 2007). It is said that the long 
term marginal cost of oil is a small fraction of oil price (Adelman, 1993), 
therefore, the prices are driven by the restriction of excess supply by the 
market supply leader.  Such scenario describes the OPEC monopolistic 
theory, where higher cost producers sell all they can produce and the  low 
cost producers satisfy the market supply shortage or excess demand at 
current prices and could as well restrict production (Mileva and Siegfried, 
2007). There is econometric evidence that confirms this position about 
Saudi Arabia, which plays the role  of a “swing” producer (Mileva and 
Siegfried, 2007). Other studies also support the oligopolistic nature of the 
oil market and the market dominance by Saudi Arabia and OPEC (Griffin, 
1985; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000; Dees et al, 2003).  
On the other hand, the demand for crude oil is driven by the choices of 
individual households/firms as well as other private interest groups such 
as refineries because of the economic and national security importance of 
oil (Mileva and Siegfried, 2007). The dependence of the  economy and 
national security on oil makes it inevitable for oil importing countries to 
influence oil demand (just like oil exporting countries influence the 
supply).  Therefore, the oil market is also influenced by the oil importing 
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countries. These influences could be in the form of investing public funds 
in the development of alternative energy sources (in order to create 
substitutes), explorations based on advanced technology, fiscal 
instruments, environmental regulations, political interventions, stra tegic 
oil reserves, etc. ( Energy Intelligence, 2004; Barbosa and Sorkin, 2005; 
Mileva and Siegfried, 2007).  
However, it has been shown also that the crude oil market is competitive 
especially on determination of prices, where the forces of supply and 
demand determine the spot market prices (Grant et al, 2006; Mileva and 
Siegfried, 2007; Hamilton, 2009).  According to Hamilton (2008) there are 
three separate conditions that hold in equilibrium in the dynamic crude oil 
market and these conditions are storage/inventory, futures markets and 
scarcity rent factors.  
In the competitive oil market, spot prices are the market prices against 
the official prices (OPEC or major Oil companies determined) that were in 
place in the ‘70s and ‘80s because the petroleum indu stry has become 
increasingly dependent on the spot prices which also determine the term 
and futures prices (Energy Intelligence, 2004).  
The major factors that affect crude oil demand and supply are therefore 
expected to affect crude oil prices as well. In  as much as the global oil 
market is seen as competitive, there are situations where market failure 
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occurs which makes it imperfectly competitive. When a market failure 
occurs, the price of crude oil would be affected.  
This study assumes that while the market is competitive, it is dynamic and 
not fully transparent which bring about market failure. Theoretically, the 
introductions of climate change mitigation policies are expected to have 
major impacts on the oil market. Energy efficiency methods and subsid y 
on renewable energy sources are market driven climate change mitigation 
policies while carbon taxes are public/government driven policies that also 
distorts the market. When energy efficiency policies are introduced, the 
demand falls over time and such demand shocks are eventually 
transmitted to the market. When renewable energy sources are 
subsidised, the substitution effect comes into play and demand for oil also 
falls over time. However, when carbon taxes are introduced, it disrupts 
the competitive markets situation or equilibrium by driving up crude oil 
prices which leads to the increased move to discover adequate non -
carbon/less-carbon substitutes for oil over time. Therefore, it is assumed 
that even when oil demand tend to be price inelastic or have low price 
elasticity (Hamilton, 2009), the combination of the energy efficiency 
driven demand shocks, renewable energy subsidy driven substitution 
effects and carbon tax driven market distortion may affect oil prices, if not 
in the short term then in the long term. 
 
63 
 
2.2 Related Studies in the Literature 
Climate change mitigation activity entails any activity or policy related to 
the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions (IPCC, 2007). Among the 
greenhouse gases, CO2  accounts for over fifty per cent (50%) of the 
sources of global warming (UNFCCC, 2009). It is also established by the 
UNFCCC (2009) that fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) are the major sources of 
CO2  emissions and are responsible for about fifty -six per cent (56%) of the 
total global CO2 emission. So, it is assumed that major activities to reduce 
CO2  emissions would take fossil fuel consumption into consideration.  
The level of carbon intensity is defined as the standard or basis for 
measuring the utilisation of carbon emitting resources in the econo my 
(EIA, 2012). In this paper, it is assumed in line with EIA (2012) that carbon 
intensity accounts for the economy wide carbon utilisation level which can 
also show the carbon reduction level.  
Carbon intensity levels are not as flexible as crude oil pric es. The volatility 
of carbon intensity levels is shown in the figure below. Figures 1 and 2 
show the annual levels of carbon intensity and crude oil prices for a period 
of thirty-two (32) years (1980-2011). The carbon intensity levels follow a 
trend while crude oil prices are more volatile over the same period.  
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Figure 1: Annual Carbon Intensity Levels  
 
Figure 2: Annual Crude Oil Prices 
Carbon intensity is also described as the carbon dioxide emissions per unit 
of total primary energy supply in the econom y (IPCC, 2007; Kaya, 1990; 
EIA, 2012) or according to the EIA (2012), carbon intensity is an energy 
consumption weighted average of the emissions coefficients 2. 
                                                          
2
 Emissions coefficient is a unique value for scaling emissions to activity data in terms 
of a standard rate of emissions per unit  of activity (e.g.,  weight of carbon emitted per 
Btu of fossi l  fuel consumed).  
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Kaya (1990) identifies carbon intensity, energy intensity, gross domestic 
product per capita and population as indicators for the level of energy 
related carbon emissions. Energy Modelling Forum (2011) indicates that 
climate change mitigation activity or policy such as carbon tax would likely 
reduce (affect) carbon intensity of an economy’s total en ergy 
consumption. OECD (2008) also states that “on-going efficiency gains” 
(mitigation activity) are expected to contribute to the decline in carbon 
intensity levels. This position is supported by the IPCC (2007) which 
further states that the change in carbon intensity as a result of CO 2  
reduction may affect oil prices and oil exporters’ economy. According to 
IPCC (2007) and several studies in the literature, greenhouse gases 
emissions’ mitigation is expected to affect oil price. Among these studies 
are Ghanem et al, (1999); Pershing, (2000); Barnett et al, (2004); and 
Awerbuch and Sauter (2006).  
Barnett et al (2004) discuss the different global energy economy models 
which suggest that climate policies and measures supported by the Kyoto 
Protocol and subsequent negotiations would see a reduction in the 
consumption of crude oil products in developed countries thereby leading 
to a decline in global oil demand. According to Henman, (2002) these 
energy economy models have been influential in the political econom y of 
climate change. In the short run, when climate change mitigation activity 
is introduced in developed countries or Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol, which account for 60% of world oil consumption (Barnet et al, 
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2004), oil prices would rise, thereby leading to a fall in oil demand. As a 
result of this reduction in oil demand, prices may decline in the long run. 
The effects of Annex 1 countries climate mitigation policies and measures 
on oil prices might occur through carbon taxes applied accord ing to the 
carbon content of oil (Barnet et al, 2004; Lacasta et al, 2002).  
In the different models used to estimate the impact of climate mitigation 
activity on oil exporting countries, G-cubed model - McKibbin et al (1999) , 
OPEC World Energy model (OWEM) - Ghanem et al (1999), MS-MRT model 
- Bernstein et al, (1999), CLIMOX model - Bartsch and Muller (2000), 
GREEN model - Pershing (2000) and GTEM model - Polidano et al (2000), it 
was found that climate change mitigation affects energy prices (including 
crude oil prices). Awerbuch and Sauter (2006) in their model found that a 
10% increase in renewable energy sources especially in the electricity 
sector, would reduce CO2  by 3% and global oil price reduction would be in 
the range of 3% - 10%. However, this study is different from the above 
models as it is based on a dynamic panel model which shows the short and 
long terms impacts and focuses on climate change mitigation activities in 
six regions, viz, Africa, Asia and Oceania, Central and South America, the 
EU, the Middle East and North America. This study undertakes a regional -
level analysis because of the geographical similarities among the countries 
in a region. 
Based on the existing studies, this paper assumes that causality runs from 
carbon intensity to crude oil prices. Although sudden changes in crude oil 
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prices may affect some climate change mitigation policies and measures 
such as technological innovation in the long run, this study assumes that 
this effect may not be significant because of the growing  consensus on the 
impacts of climate change and there are other factors that drive 
technological innovations other than crude oil prices (Grubbler et al, 1999; 
Weyant, 2000). However, in this study, there is a provision to take care of 
endogeneity by using the AB dynamic panel model, which uses lagged 
explanatory variables as instruments.  
Apart from carbon intensity, other climate change mitigation related 
factors affect crude oil prices and they are covered by the stochastic term 
in the model. This study a lso makes provision for controls and some other 
deficiencies in the data by introducing some categorical variables to 
account for the outliers observed as possible structural breaks in the 
crude oil prices’ data. Some other factors are not included because  of lack 
of or insufficient data. 
2.3 Data 
The data used for the study covers from 1980 –  2011. The carbon intensity 
data are from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) online 
database. The carbon intensity data for all the regions are derived usi ng 
market exchange rates (metric tons of carbon dioxide per thousand year 
2005 U.S. Dollars). This feature makes carbon intensity a good indicator 
because crude oil is priced in US Dollars as well. For the different regions, 
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certain countries are considered due to the availability of data on carbon 
intensity for the period under considerat ion. The study focuses on regions 
because the country level data for some countries of interest are so small 
that they may lead to poor statistical results. The crude oil price data are 
collated from the International Energy Agency (IEA) database and OPEC 
annual statistical bulletin3. The OPEC prices are based on a weighted 
average index of currency exchange rates in the modified Geneva I 
Agreement. The crude oil prices data are diversified as follows; the prices 
from 1980 – 1981 are based on the posted prices of the Arab Light. The 
prices from 1982 – 2005 are based on the OPEC Reference Basket and from 
2005 – 2009, the prices are based on OPEC’s new Basket methodology. The 
US WTI prices are used for the North America region , UK Brent prices for 
the EU, Nigerian Light crude prices for Africa region, Saudi Arabian Light 
crude prices for Middle East region, Indonesia Minas crude prices for 
Asia/Oceania region and Venezuela Light crude prices for South/Central 
America region. These prices are reported in US dollars.  The data are 
estimated in log forms.  
3. Methodology and Modelling Framework 
This study utilises the AB dynamic panel model because the regressor(s) 
may be correlated with the error term E it.   The AB dynamic panel model is 
also considered because of the time-invariant regional characteristics 
                                                          
3
 OPEC Statist ical Bulletins (1980 –  2010) 
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(fixed effects) such as geographical and demographic factors which may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The AB dynamic panel model 
also takes care of the problems related to the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable P it -1 as a regressor. 
The standard model for this dynamic panel study is specified below using 
the Arellano-Bond GMM approach4: 
P i t = γP i t-1  + βC i t + ρZ i + α i + ԑ it ............(i) 
Where P i t and C i t are the crude oil price in regions, i and periods t; and 
carbon intensity level in regions i and periods t, and where α i* are the 
(unobserved) individual region effects, ρZ i*  are time-invariant explanatory 
variables and ԑ it is the error term with  
  
E (ԑ it) = 0...............(ii)
 
It is assumed that;  
E(α i) = 0  ..............(iii), and  
E(α i C i t) = 0...........(iv)  
Introducing the GMM’s first difference approach, the model takes care of 
the individual effects α i and time-invariant explanatory variables Z i  
(P t - P t -1)   =  γ(P t-1 - Pt -2 )  + β (C i t  - C i , t-1) + ԑ it  - ԑ it-1............(v) 
                                                          
4
 Arellano and Bond,  op. c it  
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For t = 2, ...., T. 
To overcome the problems of endogeneity in the model, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) recommend using instrumental variables. More specifically, 
they propose using lagged values of the explanatory variables as 
instruments.5 It is also assumed that all time varying explanatory 
variables, in this case, carbon intensity levels are strictly exogenous, that 
is  
E(C΄ i t  ԑ it) = 0..............(vi)  
Letting ∆ = (1-L) where L denotes the lag operator and  
Y i t   = (p i t0,  p i t1 ,  ----, y  i , t -2, c i΄)΄ (t-1 + TK1,1) ...........(vii)  
Where c i΄ = (c i1΄, ..., c iT  ) 
And for each period, there is the existence of the following or thogonal 
conditions 
E (p i t  ∆ ԑ it) = 0.............(viii)  
t = 2,..., T 
Introducing the stacked (T-1) first differenced equations in matrix form, 
gives the following 
∆P i t =  ∆P i t-1γ  +  ∆C i tβ +  ∆ԑ it  ...........(ix) 
                                                          
5
 Ibid  
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i  = 1, ..., N 
This study estimates the K i+1 parameters of the ϴ = (γ ,β΄)΄ vector, where 
there is T(T-10 (K1 +1/2) moment conditions (if C i t are strictly exogenous) 
that can be presented as 
E(W i∆ԑ it  ) = E [W i  (∆P i t - ∆P i t-1γ  -  ∆C i tβ)] = 0.................(x)  
However, the above model specifications can also be adjusted further 
conditional on or with reference to the available data in some regions or 
countries, this study estimates the relationship between crude oil prices 
and carbon intensity using the dynamic panel model in equation (ix) 
above. 
3.1 Diagnostic Tests 
The validity of the instruments specified in the estimation process using 
the AB GMM approach are tested using the Sargan test of over -identifying 
restrictions.  The Sargan test is used to check whether the instruments are 
truly exogenous which is based on the assumption that the residuals are 
uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables. It is asymptotically 
distributed as chi square (X 2) and tests the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid. The null hypothesis can only be r ejected if the p-
value of the chi-square is less than 0.1 or 0.05. Therefore, a model with 
valid or exogenous instruments would have a higher p -value of the Sargan 
statistic. Sargan test is preferred to other weak instruments tests such as 
Hansen test and F-test because it is the standard test for weak 
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instruments under the AB dynamic panel model, less vulnerable to 
instrument proliferation and based on the optimal weighting matrix 
(MacDonald et al, 2010). It is pertinent to use Sargan test to confirm the 
validity of the instruments and indicate that the error term is uncorrelated 
with the instruments when the dynamic panel model is used (Bowsher, 
2002).  
Similarly, it is also vital to check for the nonexistence of serial correlation 
in the error term, as consistency of the estimates depends on it. This 
study carries out the first order (AR1) and second order (AR2) serial 
correlation tests to determine whether serial correlation exists or not. 
Based on a priori theoretical assumptions, the rejection of the nu ll 
hypothesis for first order serial correlation (AR1) is expected by design or 
default but failure to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of second 
order serial correlation (AR2) leads to the decision that the original error 
terms are serially uncorrelated, while the test statistics are asymptotically 
distributed as standard normal variables. The dynamic panel model is 
correctly specified if the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis 
based on the outcome of the second order (AR2) serial corre lation test. 
This means that the estimated coefficients in the model are consistent and 
reliable. 
The study also identified some outliers in the oil prices data which are 
tested for structural breaks. The structural breaks are controlled for, by 
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introducing dummy variables accordingly. The dummy variables are Y1986, 
Y1990, Y1998, Y2000 and Y2008.  
4. Empirical Results 
The AB dynamic panel model results as shown in table 4.1 below, contain 
the estimates of the coefficients of the effects of carbon intensity on 
crude oil prices for the baseline or reference case (column 2), where the 
direct relationship between crude oil prices and carbon intensity is 
estimated, and the control (s) for the outliers/structural breaks identified 
in the crude oil price data are reported in column 3. The dummy variables 
serve as impulse and control variables to determine the effects of 
predetermined shocks as a result of rise and fall in oil prices. The 
deterministic variables are used to control for the outliers observed in the 
crude oil price data for 1986, 1990, 1998, 2000 and 2008. These variables 
capture the effects of identified events related to the oil price data and 
improve the robustness of the model.  
Some of the outliers could be explained as a result of the gulf oil crisis  in 
1990, the new millennium related price shocks in 1999 and the price rise 
in 2008 respectively. The study focuses on the short run and long run 
carbon intensity effects on crude oil prices. The estimated panel results 
are presented below in table 4.1.  
Model/panel 1 shows the panel result for the reference case. The result 
indicates that a 1% change in carbon intensity causes about 2.1% change 
in crude oil prices in the short run and 1 4% change in the long run. It 
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shows a positive relationship between crud e oil prices and carbon 
intensity and it is statistically significant at all levels. Column 3 shows the 
panel results when the control variables for the outliers are introduced. It 
indicates a statistically significant, positive relationship between oil pr ices 
and carbon intensity. The relationship estimates show that 1% change in 
carbon intensity causes 1.6% change in oil prices in the short run and 
about 8.4% in the long run. The speed of adjustment of crude oil prices to 
changes in carbon intensity in a period is about 15% in the reference case 
and 19% in the controlled model . Although, the methodology of this study 
is different from the existing studies in the literature, the estimates are 
similar. Awerbuch and Sauter (2006) found that the effect of carb on 
emissions reduction on oil prices is within the range of 3% -10% , while this 
study finds that the effect of carbon intensity on oil price is within the 
range of 1.6% - 2.1% in the short run and 8.4% - 14% in the long run. This 
study’s results find a pos itive relationship between oil price and carbon 
intensity, which is also in line with McKibbin et al (1999), Ghanem et al 
(1999), Bernstein et al, (1999), Bartsch and Muller (2000), Pershing (2000) 
and Polidano et al (2000), all of which found that there i s a relationship 
between oil prices and greenhouse gases emissions reduction activity.  
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Table 4.1: Model Estimates 
 Panel 1 - Baseline Panel 2 – Structural 
breaks control 
Oil Price (Lag) 
Estimate 
Standard Error 
P-value 
 
0.85 
(0.079) 
0.000 
 
0.81 
 (0.0430) 
0.000 
 
Carbon Intensity  
 
Short-run  
Standard error 
P-value 
 
Long-run  
 
 
 
2.1 
(0.8772) 
0.015 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
1.6 
(0.7436) 
0.024 
 
8.4 
 
 
4.1 Sargan and Serial Correlation Tests  
The Sargan and second order serial correlation (AR 2) diagnostic tests 
shown in table 4.2 below indicate that the instruments are valid and there 
is no serial correlation. With the outcome of the Sargan test, the study 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test that the instruments 
are valid. For the serial correlation, the study also failed to reject the 
second order serial correlation null hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation. The outcome of the diagnostic tests shows that the 
results are robust, reliable, efficient and consistent for the models/panels 
reported in table 4.1 above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Table 4.2: Diagnostic Tests 
Diagnostics 
tests  
Panel 1 - Baseline Panel 2 – Structural 
breaks control 
Sargan Test: 
chi2(156) 
Prob > chi2  
 
Serial-  
Correlation 
Test:  
AR (1): z  
Pr > z  
 
AR(2): z  
Pr > z  
  
163.28 
0.3286 
 
 
 
 
-6.93 
(0.000) 
 
-1.49 
(0.137) 
 
185.46  
0.335 
 
 
 
 
-3.02 
(0.000) 
 
-5.08 
(0.160) 
 
 
4.2 Discussion and Summary 
From the study’s results presented above in table 4.1, it is safe to state 
that carbon intensity affects crude oil prices, especially in the long run. 
This shows that a unit change in the level of carbon intensity has a 
significant effect on oil prices. However, the rate of effect or impact of 
this influence from the estimated “speed of adjustment” is low at 1 5% and 
19%.  
With reference to climate change mitigation activity, these empirical 
outcomes show that there is a relationship between crude oil prices and 
CO2 emissions reduction.  
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Although so many factors affect crude oil prices, this study has shown that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between crude oil prices and 
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climate change mitigation activity using the AB dynamic panel model. 
Other factors that affect the prices of crude oil such as production, supply, 
demand and taxes may have more or larger effe cts but it is evident in this 
study that climate change mitigation activity also affects oil prices.  
This study concludes from the empirical outcomes that significant changes 
in crude oil prices can be induced by changes in climate change mitigation 
activity in a country or region that is a net importer of crude oil, which are 
majorly the industrialised countries and Annex 1 countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The study outcomes show that it is safe to state that 
climate change mitigation activities especi ally CO2 reductions using carbon 
intensity as indicator are expected to have effects on crude oil prices.  
There are also some research implications from this study. The carbon 
intensity data used in this study covers the entire economy but further 
research can look into estimating a model of carbon intensity levels in 
transportation sector only using the utilisation of renewable energy 
sources like biofuel consumption. The reason for such model is to 
investigate the difference between carbon intensity leve ls in the economy 
as whole and the carbon intensity levels in the transportation sector 
which accounts for about 80% of crude oil consumptions. However, the 
insufficient data on biofuel consumption in all the regions made the 
estimation of this model difficult at this stage. Therefore, as data on 
biofuel consumption in these regions becomes available in the future, it 
may be necessary to also estimate the impacts of biofuel consumption 
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induced carbon intensity levels or transportation sector based carbon 
intensity level on crude oil prices.  
It can also be assumed that an increase in crude oil prices may have a 
reasonably significant effect on climate change mitigation policy measures 
through investments in climate change mitigation technologies. 
Investments in the technology required for climate change mitigation have 
become a burden on governments across the world. Private investors are 
yet to fully embrace green investments as expected due to the risk of 
negative returns on investment. In some countries or  regions where there 
are growing interests in green investments, it is either because the 
government subsidises these private firms or they are enjoying some 
levels of tax waivers. Therefore, there is need for further investigation on 
the transmission of the impact of crude oil prices on climate change 
mitigation investments.  
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Appendix A: Regions  
In the North American region, the United States of America (USA), Canada, 
Mexico and Bermuda are the countries considered.  
 
Table A1: Countries considered in the European region  
 
1 Austria 
2 Belgium 
3 Cyprus 
4 Denmark 
5 Finland 
6 France 
7 Germany 
8 Greece 
9 Ireland 
10 Italy 
11 Luxembourg 
12 Malta 
13 Netherlands 
14 Norway 
15 Portugal 
16 Romania 
17 Spain 
18 Sweden 
19 Switzerland 
20 Turkey 
21 United Kingdom 
              
Table A2: Countries considered in the Central and South American region  
 
1 Antigua and 
Barbuda 
2 Argentina 
3 Bahamas, The 
4 Barbados 
5 Belize 
6 Bolivia 
7 Brazil 
8 Cayman Islands 
9 Chile 
10 Colombia 
11 Costa Rica 
12 Cuba 
13 Dominica 
14 Dominican Republic 
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15 Ecuador 
16 El Salvador 
17 French Guiana 
18 Grenada 
19 Guatemala 
20 Guyana 
21 Haiti 
22 Honduras 
23 Jamaica 
24 Martinique 
25 Netherlands 
Antilles 
26 Nicaragua 
27 Panama 
28 Peru 
29 Puerto Rico 
30 Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
31 Saint Lucia 
32 Saint 
Vincent/Grenadines 
33 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
34 Uruguay 
35 Venezuela 
36 Virgin Islands,  U.S. 
 
Table A3: Countries considered in the Middle East region  
 
1 Bahrain 
2 Iran 
3 Iraq 
4 Israel 
5 Jordan 
6 Kuwait 
7 Lebanon 
8 Oman 
9 Qatar 
10 Saudi Arabia 
11 Syria 
12 United Arab 
Emirates 
13 Yemen 
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Table A4: Countries considered in the African region  
 
1 Algeria 
2 Angola 
3 Benin 
4 Botswana 
5 Burkina Faso 
6 Burundi 
7 Cameroon 
8 Cape Verde 
9 Central African 
Republic 
10 Chad 
11 Comoros 
12 Congo (Brazzaville) 
13 Congo (Kinshasa) 
14 Cote d’ Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) 
15 Djibouti 
16 Egypt 
17 Equatorial Guinea 
18 Ethiopia 
19 Gabon 
20 Gambia, The 
21 Ghana 
22 Guinea 
23 Guinea-Bissau 
24 Kenya 
25 Lesotho 
26 Liberia 
27 Libya 
28 Madagascar 
29 Malawi 
30 Mali 
31 Mauritania 
32 Mauritius 
33 Morocco 
34 Mozambique 
35 Niger 
36 Nigeria 
37 Reunion 
38 Rwanda 
39 Sao Tome and 
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Principe 
40 Senegal 
41 Seychelles 
42 Sierra Leone 
43 Somalia 
44 South Africa 
45 Sudan and South 
Sudan 
46 Swaziland 
47 Tanzania 
48 Togo 
49 Tunisia 
50 Uganda 
51 Zambia 
52 Zimbabwe 
 
 
Table A5: Countries considered in Asia and Oceania region  
 
1 Afghanistan 
2 American Samoa 
3 Australia 
4 Bangladesh 
5 Bhutan 
6 Brunei 
7 Burma (Myanmar) 
8 Cambodia 
9 China 
10 Fiji 
11 Guam 
12 Hong Kong 
13 India 
14 Indonesia 
15 Japan 
16 Kiribati 
17 Korea, North 
18 Korea, South 
19 Laos 
20 Malaysia 
21 Maldives 
22 Mongolia 
23 Nepal 
24 New Zealand 
25 Pakistan 
26 Papua New Guinea 
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27 Philippines 
28 Samoa 
29 Singapore 
30 Solomon Islands 
31 Sri Lanka 
32 Taiwan 
33 Thailand 
34 Tonga 
35 Vanuatu 
36 Vietnam 
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The Impacts of Crude Oil Prices on OPEC Economies: Panel VAR Approach  
Jude Chukwudi Dike, Economics Division, University of Stirling, Stirling, 
FK9 4LA, UK. E-mail: j.c.dike@stir.ac.uk ; Mobile: +447595286960 
Abstract 
The relationship between economic growth and crude oil prices has 
received enormous attention in the literature. However, there are diverse 
views about the causality and nature of this relationship. The purpose of 
this paper is to investigate how economic growths in crude oil exporting 
countries are affected by changes in global crud e oil prices using a panel 
vector auto regression (VAR) approach. This paper examines the response 
of economic growths in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) member states to changes in crude oil prices. Findings in this paper 
show that changes in crude oil  prices, for the period under consideration,  
positively and significantly affect economic growths in OPEC member 
states. The findings emphasise the role of economic policies in insulating 
OPEC economies and other oil exporting countries from changes in crude 
oil prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: oil prices and economic growth, Panel VAR, OPEC  
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1. Introduction 
Changes in crude oil prices are expected to have macroeconomic 
consequences for both oil exporting and importing countries (Kireyev, 
2000) because crude oil is a major production input for both industrialised 
and developing countries (Ghalayini, 2011; Mehrara and Mohaghegh, 
2011). Although, the increasing concerns for global warming may have 
affected the consumption of crude oil in most countries, it is still 
influencing major economic decisions globally. It is generally assumed that 
an increase in oil prices has positive growth effects and a decrease in oil 
prices has negative growth effects on oil exporting countries (Hamilton, 
1996; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983; Rosser and Sheehan, 1995).  
Estimating the macroeconomic consequences of oil prices in crude oil 
exporting countries using the ordinary least square (OLS) method has 
serious specification concerns (Ghalayini, 2011; Adelman, 2004) . The OLS 
estimated relationship between economic growth in oil exporting 
countries and oil prices is usually biased and inconsistent as they are 
based on assumptions that make both economic growth and oil prices 
endogenous. With this a priori knowledge about the OLS approach in 
mind, it becomes necessary to estimate the effects of crude oil prices on 
the economic growth of OPEC member states using another approach 
devoid of the perceived OLS bias and inconsistency.  
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Therefore, this paper attempts to provid e consistent and unbiased 
estimates of the macroeconomic responses of OPEC member states to 
changes in crude oil prices. Although so many studies have estimated the 
impacts of oil prices on economic growth, only a few of them used an 
approach that could be said to be completely free from bias and 
inconsistency (Ghalayini, 2011; Adelman, 2004; Hamilton, 1996; Pindyck 
and Rotemberg, 1983; Rosser and Sheehan, 1995). Apart from addressing 
the biased and inconsistent nature of the OLS estimates caused by the 
endogeneity of crude oil prices, this paper also aims to determine the 
magnitude of the interactions of crude oil prices and economic growth in 
oil producing countries.  
To determine whether oil prices affect economic growth in OPEC member 
states and the magnitude of this interaction, with unbiased and consistent 
models, this paper applies the panel vector auto regression (PVAR) 
method to national level data from nine (9) OPEC member states. This 
method exploits the standard VAR method (Sims, 1980) with the 
traditional panel data approach that allows for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (Mehrara and Mohaghegh, 2011).   
The findings of this study contribute to the debate about the general 
impacts of crude oil prices on economic growth especially in oil produci ng 
countries. The findings that a change in crude oil prices has a significant 
effect on economic growth are consistent with some works in the 
literature (Hamilton, 1983, 1988, 2003, 2008; Bernanke, 1983; Lee and Ni, 
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2005; Berument et al, 2010 and Mehrara and Mohaghegh, 2011). This 
study’s results complement these studies by providing additional evidence 
on the effects of crude oil prices on economic growth. However, this study 
is different from the studies mentioned above because while these 
previous studies used dynamic regression or standard VAR techniques only 
to argue that there is relationship between economic growth and oil 
prices, this paper uses a panel VAR approach to provide new evidence in 
this area. Specifically, this study finds that the macroe conomic responses 
to oil price are positive and significant in OPEC member states as a group 
based on the structural similarities of their economies.  
This paper is organised as follows; The following section discusses and 
reviews related studies in the li terature. Section three describes the 
nature and sources of the data as well as the methodology used for the 
study. The results of this study are presented in section four while the 
conclusion and policy implications are covered in section five.  
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
In order to measure the effects of crude oil prices on OPEC economies, it 
is pertinent to review the previous studies on crude oil prices and 
economic growth. Among the studies that show empirical evidence of the 
effects of crude oil prices on economic growth, a considerable number of 
studies indicate that while increase in crude oil prices has a negative 
effect on crude oil importing countries, it has a positive effect on crude oil 
exporting countries (Devlin and Lewin, 2004; Jimenez-Rodriguez and 
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Sanchez, 2005; Gisser and Godwin, 1986).  According to Ghalayini (2011), a 
large number of technical papers on this issue exist in the literature but it 
is still not clear whether crude oil prices can be seen to have a robust 
effect on economic growth or changes in macroeconomic activities.  
Leading the empirical papers on the response of economic growth to crude 
oil price shocks is Hamilton (1983). This paper entails an observed robust 
linear relationship between economic growth a nd crude oil prices in the 
US. The study finds that an increase in crude oil prices has a negative or 
adverse effect on the US economic output (that is, a rise in price leads to 
a negative economic growth). Roubini and Setser (2004) find that crude oil 
price shocks have a stagflationary effect on the macro -economy of oil 
importing countries. According to Roubini and Setser (2004), crude oil 
price shocks significantly contributed to all the US and global recessions of 
the last three decades. Other empirical papers based on linear 
relationship assumption between economic growth and crude oil prices 
are Rasche and Tatom (1981) and Gisser and Goodwin (1986) wh ich 
estimate the crude oil price –  gross domestic product (GDP) transmission 
effects in the US. Darby (1982) and Burbidge and Harrison (1984) estimate 
the relationship between GDP and crude oil prices in other developed 
countries6.  
                                                          
6  Darby (1982) –  Japan, Germany, UK, Canada, France, Italy and the Netherlands); 
Burbidge and Harrison (1984) –  Japan, Germany, UK and Canada)  
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Some empirical studies indicate a non -linear relationship and a lower 
macroeconomic effect than the empirical effects estimated  by the above 
mentioned linearly estimated studies (Ghalayini, 2011). These non -linear 
methods are measures of indirect effects or transmission mechanisms of 
crude oil prices on real GDP growth. These indirect transmission 
mechanisms can be in the form of inflationary consequences ( Mork, 1981; 
and Bruno and Sach, 1982) or investment level and uncertainty (Bernanke, 
1983; and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) or labour market reactions (Finn, 2000; 
and Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001).  
Other major studies linking GDP to oil prices through diverse theoretical 
channels are Hamilton (1988) and Lee and Ni (2002) which apply 
consumption smoothing on industrial and durable goods as a linkage to 
determine the relationship between GDP and crude oil prices.  These 
studies empirically indicate that the effects of crude oil prices on GDP can 
be determined using indirect transmission mechanisms. According to Mork 
(1989), the effects of oil price increases are different from the decreases 
using an asymmetric model to estimate the rel ationship.  
In response to the growing non-linear models, Lee et a l (1995) and 
Hamilton (1996) apply the scaled and net specification models respectively 
to estimate the relationship between GDP growth and crude oil prices. 
Other studies that show evidence of non-linear relationship between real 
GDP growth and crude oil prices are Jimenez-Rodriguez (2004), Hamilton 
(2003, 2008) and Ghalayini (2011). While using granger causality, Jimenez -
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Rodriguez (2004) finds that there is a significant relationship betwee n GDP 
growth and crude oil prices in oil importing countries with the exclusion of 
Japan; Hamilton (2008) finds that the relationship between economic 
growth and oil prices is hard to determine statistically as there might be 
other forces affecting both macroeconomic activities and GDP growth that 
cannot be detected. 
Unlike the studies above, Ghalayini (2011) finds that there is no causal 
relationship between economic growth and crude oil prices in most 
regions or economic groups including OPEC, Indian, Chi na, and Russia 
except for the G77 countries where there is empirical evidence that a 
significant relationship exists between economic growth and crude oil 
prices. There are other studies on the macroeconomic eff ects of crude oil 
price shocks in oil exporting countries but they are focused on individual 
countries. For instance,  Olomola and Adejumo (2006) using VAR approach 
finds that oil price shocks significantly determine macroeconomic 
variables such as real exchange rate in Nigeria. Other studies that fi nd a 
positive relationship between macroeconomic variables and crude oil price 
shocks in some OPEC member states are; Al -Mutairi (1993) –  Kuwait, 
Eltony (2001) –  Kuwait, Dibooglu and Aleisa (2004) – Saudi Arabia, Anshasy 
et al (2005) –  Venezuela, Boye (2001) – Ecuador, and Farzanegan and 
Markwardt (2009) –  Iran. 
                                                          
7
 Also known as G8 countries with the inclusion of Russia (joined the group in 2007).  
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Very few studies have considered an OPEC-wide estimation of the 
macroeconomic effects of crude oil prices. Mehrara and Mohaghegh 
(2011) find that there is a significant relationship between some 
macroeconomic variables and crude oil price shocks in OPEC member 
states. Berument et al (2010) estimate the effects of oil price shocks on 
economic output in Middle East and North America (MENA) countries with 
similar conclusion that oil shocks have significant impacts on economic 
outputs. Alotaibi (2006) investigates the interactions between oil price 
variation and some macroeconomic variables in the member states of the 
Persian Gulf Cooperation Council; Mehrara and Oskui (2007) find that oil 
shocks are the main source of output fluctuations in three OPEC member 
states and Indonesia –  Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Kireyev (2000) using 
a PVAR method, similar to this study’s methodology, also investigates  the 
macroeconomic dynamics in some OPEC member states c lassified as Arab 
countries. Finally, Lescaroux and Migno (2008) investigating OPEC and 
other countries, also find that there is a significant relationship between 
some macroeconomic variables and oil price shocks in the short run and 
long run respectively. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 The Nature and Sources of Data 
The data used for this empirical study are the real crude oil prices, real 
GDP, current accounts growth and money supply growth rate of OPEC 
member states. The available data are specifically for  nine (9) OPEC 
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member states (Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirate (UAE) and Venezuela) excluding three other 
countries that complete OPEC’s twelve -country membership (Angola, Iraq 
and Libya), because of insufficient data for these countries.  Some of these 
data, especially crude oil prices, are available on weekly basis but were 
transformed to annual basis by calculating the average and annual 
differences where necessary. The sample frame for this study is from 1981 
–  2011. 
The annualised differences in real GDP represent economic growth 
(calculated as the year on year differences of the real GDP). The 
annualised differences in real crude oil price represent the crude oil price 
shocks (calculated as the year on year differences of the real crude oil 
prices). The other variables – current account growth and money supply 
growth, are introduced into the model in their given value as they are in 
percentages already. 
The data on crude oil prices are from the OPEC annual statistical bulletin 
(2012) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) database, while 
the data on GDP, current accounts growth and money supply growth are 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) database. The real 
GDP values are deflated at 2000 constant US dollars.  
In line with the a priori and theoretical assumptions, the study formulates 
a relationship between OPEC’s economic growth and crude oil price by 
99 
 
using the specified study’s methodology. From a theoretical basis, it is 
safe to assume that causality also runs from crude oil prices to economic 
growth in OPEC member states for the sample period. However, the panel 
VAR technique takes care of the issue of reverse causality where it exists.  
3.2 Methodology 
The model estimation of the relationship between economic growth and 
crude oil prices is based on a panel VAR technique. The panel VAR is used 
because its VAR component treats all variables as jointly endogenous, 
thereby, reflecting the realities of interdependence, where it exi sts, 
without distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous variables. The 
traditional panel component allows for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (Love and Zicchino, 2006) and also accommodates country -
specific and OPEC-wide panel analyses allowing for comparative analysis 
of the different countries in the panel. These features make the panel VAR 
the ideal choice of methodology to analyse the macroeconomic responses 
in OPEC member states to crude oil price changes. The reduced form order 
of the panel VAR model is specified as:  
Y i t = Γ(L)Y i t-1  + U i + ԑ i t      (i) 
Where Y i t is a vector of stationary variables {∆GDP,CA, M2, ∆ROP } with 
∆GDP = economic growth (annualised changes in GDP); CA = current 
accounts growth (derived from Balance of Payment [BOP]); M2 = money 
supply growth rate; ∆ROP = annualised changes in real oil prices  or oil 
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price shocks; U i = vector of country specific effects and ԑ t = vector of error 
terms. While the crude oil price shocks represent external shocks, the 
current accounts growth and the money supply growth rates are 
introduced into the model as well to determine the effects of internal 
shocks on economic growth, which also makes the model robust. Γ (L) is 
the matrix polynomial in the lag operator with Γ (L) = Γ 1  L
1  +   Γ2  L
 2  + ... + 
Γp L
p   (ii). 
In developing the panel VAR model, this study imposed the restriction that 
underlying structures are the same for each cross -sectional unit in line 
with Love and Zicchino (2006). This restriction or constraint on the 
parameters is expected to be different in practice, therefore, the panel 
VAR model allows for heterogeneity of the individual variables by 
introducing country fixed effects. Due to the endogenous variables lag, 
these country fixed effects are correlated with the regressors. This makes 
the elimination of the fixed effects necessary. The fixed effects can be 
eliminated by the mean-differencing procedure or the Helmert procedure 
also known as forward mean-differencing8 (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
However, using the mean differencing would create biased coefficients. 
Hence, the need for an alternative technique arises. Following Love and 
Zicchino (2006) and Boubtane et al (2012), the Helmert transformation 
(which allows for the orthogonality between transformed variables and 
lagged regressors, making it convenient to use lagged regressors as 
                                                          
8 Forward mean-differencing is described as taking the mean of al l the future 
observations available for each country -year  
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instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM 9), is used in this 
study.10  
The model also makes provisions for the error terms and shocks in order 
to calculate the impulse response fun ctions (IRF) and the forecast error 
variance decompositions (FEVD). The IRF and the FEVD are required to 
show the dynamic responses and the magnitude of the total effect 
respectively. The estimation of the interaction between OPEC’s economic 
growth and crude oil prices is based on the IRFs and the FEVDs after 
estimating the VAR model. The IRFs usually show the response of an 
endogenous variable to a shock in another variable in the model or system 
over time. The FEVD quantify the measure of contribution of the source of 
shocks to the variations in each endogenous variable in the model or 
system with reference to the specified forecast horizon.  
The IRFs are based on the Cholesky decomposition approach. The Cholesky 
decomposition strategy entails a contemporaneous relationship among the 
variables. The first variable in the VAR system impacts the other variables 
contemporaneously, while the following variables in the VAR impacts the 
variables listed earlier only in their lag form. In the same vein, the 
variables listed earlier in the VAR are assumed to be more exogenous than 
the following variables. Considering that the variables of interest are GDP 
and Oil Price, GDP is placed first in the model while current account 
                                                          
9
 Generalised Method of Moments  
10
 In this model,  the number of regressors equals the number of instruments; 
therefore, the model is just identified.  
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growth follows before money supply growth rate and oil price. Therefore, 
the VAR model ordering is as follows:  
Model: (GDP i t; CURRENT_ACCT i t ; MONEY_SUPPLY i t; OIL_PRICE i t) 
The lags for the model are selected using the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). Finally, this study also carried out the statio narity and cointegration 
tests for all the variables as well as granger causality tests.  
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 below shows the summary statistics of the variables:   
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observation 
GDP* 4.03385 10.67596 -40.25348 80.36909 N = 279 
     N = 9 
     T = 31 
Oil Price* 2.82166 12.21071 -32.07 29.94 N = 270 
     N = 9 
     T = 30 
Current Account* 1.42e+10 2.68e+10 -2.75e+10 1.32e+11 N = 279 
     N = 9 
     T = 31 
Money Supply* 17.1374 18.43988 -57.23532 153.6837 N = 279 
     N = 9 
     T = 31 
*Note: GDP = annualised GDP differences; Oil Price = annualised real oil 
price differences; Current Accounts = current account growth rate; Money 
Supply = money supply growth rate 
 
Given the summary statistics of the panel data above, the following 
diagnostic tests were carried out to analyse and understand the 
characteristics of the variables. First, this study carried out the lag 
selection. Second, the analyses of the stationarity properties of the 
variables are considered. Third, the cointegration properties of the 
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variables are checked and fourth, the study shows the nature of causality 
for the variables of interest.  
3.4 Lag Selection 
The selection of the correct lag length is necessary for panel VAR. 
According to Kireyev (2001), excessively short lags may fail to capture the 
system’s dynamics leading to omission of variables, coefficients’ bias and 
serial correlation based errors while lag lengths that are too long causes 
rapid loss of degree of freedom and over parameterisation. Considering 
the time dimension of the data and the number of variables the system 
was tested for three to five lag lengths. The correct lag length of five (5) 
as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) an d other 
information criteria is used for the panel VAR estimation. The lag -length 
selection table is presented in table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Lag selection 
Lag LL LR P AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -872.363   70.1091 70.1632 70.3041 
1 -838.382 67.963 0.000 68.6705 68.941 69.6456 
2 -818.217 40.33 0.001 68.3373 68.8242 70.0925 
3 -797.632 41.17 0.001 67.9705 68.6737 70.5058 
4 -772.034 51.196 0.000 67.2027 68.1222 70.518 
5 -718.615 106.84* 0.000 64.2092* 65.3451* 68.3046* 
Endogenous: GDP; Current Account; Money Supply; Oil Price 
Exogenous: constant 
 
3.5 Stationarity Properties 
Initial use of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) indicate that the variables – economic 
growth (GDP), crude oil price (ROP), current accounts and money supply 
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growth are non-stationary. To confirm whether these observations are 
true or not, the study carried out formal stationarity tests using the panel 
unit root tests. The panel unit root tests included the constant, time trend 
and five lags in line with the general and specific stationarity analysis 
methodology.  At the level forms, the null hypotheses that the variables 
are non-stationary are not rejected, indicating non-stationarity for all the 
variables. Most importantly, the variables of interest - economic growth 
and crude oil prices, are non-stationary respectively. The table showing 
the stationarity tests outcome is presented in table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Panel unit root test 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots                                      No. of Panels = 9 
Ha: Panels are stationary                                            No. of Periods = 31 
ADF regressions: 5 lags 
 GDP Oil Price Current Acct Money Supply  
Unadjusted t -8.5086 -13.6573 4.0165 -9.3238 
Adjusted t* 6.9359 33.6930 41.9000 9.0789 
p-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
3.6 Cointegration Analysis  
This study carried out the necessary cointegration analysis after the 
stationarity tests above. The outcome of the cointegration analysis shows 
that considering the long run relationship between economic growth and 
all the variables especially crude oil prices, the study rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of the alternative hypothesis that 
at least there is one cointegration relationship at the five percent (5%) 
significance level. Given that the panel unit root test showed that the 
variables are non-stationary in their levels and differenced forms, the 
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outcome of the cointegration tests satisfies the a priori assumptions of 
stationarity of the variables. The study al lows all the variables to be 
included in the panel VAR model in their levels forms with the 
introduction of the lags where necessary. This approach prevents the loss 
of important information from the time-series co-movements of the 
variables (Kireyev, 2001). The outcome of the cointegration test is 
presented in table 3.4 below. 
Table 3.4: Cointegration test                        
Trend: constant                                                  Lags = 5  
Max 
rank 
Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace 
statistics 
5% 
critical 
1% 
critical 
0 68 -802.9894  229.6854 47.21 54.46 
1 75 -736.90312 0.99494 97.5128 29.68 35.65 
2 80 -701.36357 0.94176 26.4337 15.41 20.04 
3 83 -688.28806 0.64867 0.2827*1*5 3.76 6.65 
4 84 -688.14671 0.01124    
      *presence of cointegration relat ionship          
           
 
            
4. Results 
The panel VAR strategy for analysing the macroeconomic response to 
crude oil prices in OPEC economies follows Kireyev (2001), Love and 
Zicchino (2006) and Boubtano et al (2012) Panel VAR estimation 
strategies, which entail the model identification (using the stationarity 
test, lag selection, causal ordering and restrictions) and computing the 
impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition. 
Therefore, this section presents the impulse res ponse function and 
variance decomposition from the panel VAR.  
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4.1 Impulse Response Functions   
The IRF table presented in table 3.5 below shows that economic growth in 
OPEC member states respond positively and significantly to a 10% 
deviation in crude oil prices by 1.4% in the short run and 1.7% in the long 
run indicating that oil shocks among other variables affect OPEC’s 
economic growth within the period under consideration. This means that 
economic growth in OPEC member states respond positively and 
significantly to crude oil price shocks.  
This study’s outcomes with regards to economic growth and crude oil 
prices are in line with the empirical studies of Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) 
as well as Dibooglu and Aleisa (2004), which independently found th at 
world crude oil price shocks have positive impacts on domestic 
macroeconomic variables in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
However, these findings are not consistent with the findings of Ghalayini 
(2011) which suggest that oil price shocks do not affect economic growth s 
in OPEC member states and Barsky and Kilian (2004) which suggest that 
domestic macroeconomic variables may cause global oil price movements.  
However,  Barsky and Kilian (2004) investigate the relationship between 
domestic macroeconomic variables and oil prices with reference to the US, 
which is an oil importing country while this study is focused on OPEC, 
which is an oil exporting countries group.  
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Table 3.5: Impulse Response Function table  
Step GDP response to Oil Price impulse Oil Price response to GDP impulse 
 IRF Lower* Upper* IRF Lower* Upper* 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 .145746 -.06107 .352562 -.005226 -.736346 .725895 
2 .156074 -.18673 .498878 -.16968 -1.1007 .761337 
3 .070358 -.325702 .466417 -.244739 -1.3367 .847226 
4 .193709 -.227489 .614907 -.106826 -1.40169 1.18804 
5 .178355 -.287241 .64395 -.581195 -1.95579 .793401 
6 .148765 -.290338 .587868 -.557313 -1.91065 .796027 
7 .166651 -.229476 .562778 -.388438 -1.68177 .904891 
8 .131392 -.264532 .527316 -.477324 -1.75617 .801525 
9 .194861 -.22285 .612572 -.384212 -1.78209 1.01366 
10 .173099 -.266198 .612397 -.484331 -1.90834 .939674 
*95%  lower and upper bounds 
 
4.2 Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition reports are presented in table 3.6 below. The 
variance decomposition shows that in th e short term about 6% of the 
fluctuations in OPEC’s economic growth(s) are explained by a 100% 
deviation in crude oil price shocks. In the long term, say ten (10) years, a 
100% deviation in crude oil pr ice shocks accounts for about 11% of the 
fluctuations in economic growth in OPEC economies.  
From the above outcome, crude oil prices significantly affect economic 
growths in OPEC economies both in the short run and long run. However, 
economic growths in OPEC member states cannot significantly affect 
global oil prices within the period under consideration. This strand of the 
result is in line with the a priori expectations. This outcome is also 
consistent with the previous studies’ findings for the relationship between 
oil exporting countries’ economies and crude oil prices or crude oil price 
shocks. Some of these studies are Saptafora and Warner (1995); Dibooglu 
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and Aleisa (2004); Mehrara and Oskui (2007); Farzanegan and Markwardt 
(2009) and Berument et al. (2010).  
Generally, this study finds that barring any country level response, 
changes in oil prices are transmitted to OPEC economies. The study’s 
outcome that macroeconomic activities respond to oil prices is further 
confirmed by the VAR granger causality test in table 3.7 which suggest 
that crude oil prices granger causes economic growth in OPEC member 
states.  
This study’s outcomes show that oil price increase or rise should translate 
to more revenue for the OPEC governments from crude oil exports. These 
revenues or oil windfalls are used to boost major de velopment such as 
infrastructures and could also be used to finance the budgets of these 
countries. The level of these impacts in the different countries is also 
different as these countries respond differently to changes in crude oil 
prices (Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008 and Berument et al., 2010). 
Governments’ budget expenditures, exchange rates, money supply and 
imports among others are the expected transmission mechanisms for 
crude oil price shocks on OPEC economies. This assumption is explained by 
the positive relationship between current accounts balance and money 
supply growth, and crude oil prices in the this study’s model. Although, 
the current accounts balance and money supply growth variables were 
included in the model to boost the robustness of the model, they also 
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show that while they are affected by oil prices and economic growth, they 
affect economic growth but do not have any effect on oil price.  
Table 3.6: Variance decomposition 
Step GDP response to Oil Price impulse Oil Price response to GDP impulse 
 FEVD Lower* Upper* FEVD Lower* Upper* 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 .051384 -.117198 .219966 
2 .064642 -.114228 .243513 .051615 -.120534 .223764 
3 .061811 -.112378 .236 .061313 -.125045 .24767 
4 .076044 -.153395 .305483 .056431 -.124067 .23693 
5 .111401 -.170578 .393381 .053266 -.116019 .222551 
6 .107632 -.162985 .378249 .060707 -.091117 .21253 
7 .108391 -.167238 .384021 .060437 -.090798 .211673 
8 .108148 -.168382 .384678 .059353 -.090054 .208759 
9 .107507 -.166639 .381653 .05437 -.087741 .196481 
10 .115668 -.177431 .408767 .051659 -.088772 .192089 
*95%  lower and upper bounds 
 
 
Table 3.7: Granger Causality test  
Granger Causality Wald tests 
Equation Excluded Chi2 Prob>Chi2 
GDP Oil Price 28.391 0.000 
GDP Current Account - - 
GDP Money Supply 7.5914 0.022 
GDP All 29.034 0.000 
    
Oil Price GDP 2.9645 0.227 
Oil Price Current Account 0.76322 0.683 
Oil Price Money Supply 0.80013 0.670 
Oil Price ALL 5.0997 0.405 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the relationship and interaction between econ omic 
growths in OPEC member states and crude oil prices using a panel VAR 
approach. The study is conducted using the data of nine (9) OPEC member 
states from 1981 to 2011.  This study finds that economic growths in OPEC 
economies have a positive relationsh ip with crude oil price shocks. The 
study’s results also show that while crude oil prices affect economic 
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growths in OPEC member states, economic growths in OPEC member 
states do not affect crude oil prices.  
This study adds to the works of Kireyev (2000),  Devlin and Lewin (2004), 
Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011) and Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011) among 
other previous studies that focused on the relationship between economic 
growth and crude oil prices.  It also contributes to the literature on energy 
prices and macroeconomic responses by using the panel VAR approach to 
derive more consistent and reliable estimates on the magnitude and 
direction of the relationship between economic growth and crude oil 
prices.  
5.1 Policy Implications 
The policy implications of this study’s findings are potentially important 
for OPEC member states and other crude oil exports’ revenues dependent 
economies. With the expectation that  short or long term changes in crude 
oil prices may have impacts on their economies, it is expected that they 
should introduce or enhance buffer policies that w ill insulate their 
economies from the volatility in global crude oil prices. Their energy and 
economic policies should focus on developing or increasing investments 
for future development purposes. Although, most crude oil exporting 
countries have “stabilisation funds” set aside to address any future shocks 
on their economies whether from crude oil price volatility or not, it is 
important to consider the effects of crude oil prices on their economies 
with reference to their annual budgets, fiscal and monetary policies. There 
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is need for further diversification of the exports and trade components of 
these countries as well. For OPEC member states, it is expected that they 
further diversify their economies by developing other sectors of the 
economies such as agriculture and manufacturing  sectors. These policy 
effects and recommendations are however country specific as the policy 
response to the risks of crude oil price fluctuations should be based on a 
cautionary diagnosis and analysis of the causal trends, transmission 
mechanisms and previous responses in the different OPEC member states.  
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8. Appendix A 
Helmert Transformation – Boubtane et al (2012) and Love and Zicchino 
(2005) 
 
“In this procedure, to remove the fixed effects, all variables in the model 
are transformed in deviations from forward means. Let  
xmit = PTis=t+1 xmis/(T i −t)  
denote the means obtained from the future values of  xmit, a variable in 
the vector  
Xit = (x1it, x2it, . . . , xMit ) ′,  
where Ti denotes the last period of data available for a given country 
series.  
Let ¯ǫmit denote the same transformation of ǫmit , where ǫ it = (ǫ1it, ǫ2it, 
. . . , ǫMit ) ′.  
 
Hence we get transformed variables:  
˜xmit = δit(xmit− ¯xmit )     (2) 
and ˜ǫmit = δit(ǫmit− ¯ǫmit ) (3)  
 
where δit = p(T i − t)/(T i − t + 1).  
For the last year of data this transformation cannot be calculated , since 
there are no future values for the construction of the forward means. The 
final transformed model is thus given by:  
˜X it = �(L) ˜X it + ˜ǫit   (4) 
 
where ˜X it = (˜x1it, ˜x2it, . . . , ˜xMit ) ′ and ˜ǫit = (˜ǫ1it, ˜ǫ2it, . . . , ˜ǫMit 
) ′  
 
The first-difference procedure has the weakness of magnifying gaps in 
unbalanced panels (as in our case). The forward means differencing is an 
alternative to the first-difference procedure and has the virtue of 
preserving sample size in panels with gaps (Roodman, 20 09). This 
transformation is an orthogonal deviation, in which each observation is 
expressed as a deviation from average future observations. Each 
observation is weighted so as to standardize the variance. If the original 
errors are not auto correlated and are characterized by a constant 
variance, the transformed errors should exhibit similar properties. Thus, 
this transformation preserves homoscedasticity and does not induce serial 
correlation (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Additionally, this technique allows 
use of the lagged values of regressors as instruments, and estimates the 
coefficients by the generalized method of moment (GMM)”.  
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Abstract 
One of the objectives of OPEC is the security of demand for the crude oil 
exports of its members. Achieving this objective is imperative  with the 
projected decline in OECD countries’ crude oil demand among other crude 
oil demand shocks. This paper focuses on determining the external crude 
oil demand security risks of OPEC member states. In assessing these risks, 
this study introduces two indexes. The first index, Risky Energy Exports 
Demand (REED), indicates the level of energy export demand security risks 
for OPEC members. It combines measures of export dependence, economic 
dependence, monopsony risk and transportation risk. The second ind ex, 
Contribution to OPEC Risk Exposure (CORE), indicates the individual 
contribution of the OPEC members to OPEC’s risk exposure. This study 
utilises the disaggregated index approach in measuring energy demand 
security risks for crude oil and natural gas a nd involves a country level 
analysis. With the disaggregated approach, the study shows that OPEC’s 
energy export demand security risks differ across countries and energy 
types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words – Energy exports, Security of demand, OPEC, Index  
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1. Introduction 
Securing the demand for crude oil exports is a primary concern for the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), especially with the 
projected decline in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries’ crude oil de mand (OPEC, 2012a) and other 
factors that affect global crude oil demand (OPEC, 2013a). OECD countries 
are the major consumers of crude oil globally even with the recent 
increase in China’s consumption (OPEC, 2012b). Although, there have 
always been competitive demands for OPEC crude oil exports, the global 
demand for crude oil has not always been at the expected market prices 
because of the volatile nature of crude oil prices.  Therefore, one of the 
objectives of OPEC is to empower its members, who, collec tively, are the 
major oil exporters in the world, to have control of their crude oil 
production, supply and market prices (OPEC, 2013b). In order to achieve 
this objective, OPEC is faced with the challenges of securing energy 
demand. Energy demand security can be defined as the availability of a 
steady or regular demand for the energy exports (e .g. crude oil or gas) at 
competitive market prices (i .e. prices that can at least cover the 
production and transaction costs).  
In 1973, OPEC resolved to be practica lly involved in the production, supply 
and pricing of its members’ energy exports, especially crude oil. This 
decision also affected their economies significantly as most of these 
economies became heavily dependent on crude oil export revenues over 
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time. In 2008, crude oil and gas contributed about 75% of OPEC 
economies’ total exports and 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
respectively as shown in figures 1 and 2 below:   
 
Fig. 1: OPEC member states’ oil/economic dependence (Source of data: 
OPEC, 2009). 
 
Fig. 2: OPEC’s oil export dependence  (Source of data: OPEC, 2009).  
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Recent trends in the global energy industry and the economic reliance of 
OPEC members on crude oil exports have increased their concern for the 
security of energy demand. Apart from th e decline in crude oil reserves 
and production based on the peak oil assumptions, OPEC is concerned 
about other factors outside its control that may disrupt the stability of the 
global crude oil market such as imbalances of demand, falling rates of 
investment, speculative activities, exchange rate fluctuations and taxation 
on oil products (OPEC, 2013a; 2013c).  
This paper focuses on the investigation of the level of energy demand 
security risks for the different economies under OPEC’s umbrella. The 
paper addresses the external energy demand security risks dwelling on the 
problems associated with crude oil and natural gas exports. This is 
because the internal crude oil and gas consumptions in most OPEC 
member states are subsidised which leads to net loss at c ompetitive 
market conditions (Oil and Gas Journal, 2010).  
Just like energy supply security, energy demand security is not affected by 
economic rationales only but a retinue of other factors. Among these 
factors is the political rationale.  The major crude  oil and gas importing 
countries may act as monopsonists by determining the quantity of demand 
and market prices for economic and/or political reasons. When such 
monopsonists’ interruptions occur, market prices are bound to be affected 
which would either reduce crude oil and gas consumptions or require 
OPEC to reduce output to maintain the existing price levels or incur losses. 
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These factors and others discussed in details later are the building blocks 
of the methodology used for this study.  
Apart from the major conventional market factors that drive the 
consumption of crude oil in OECD countries, another factor that may 
affect  their crude oil consumption is their responses and policy measures 
to international conventions on climate change mitigation (CCM) such as 
the Kyoto Protocol. For instance, OECD countries make up the majority of 
the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Annex 1 countries. They have agreed under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol 
targets to reduce their CO 2 emissions levels using CCM policies such as 
carbon taxes or energy efficiency strategies or the introduction of 
subsidies on renewable energy sources, thereby, reducing fossil energy 
consumptions which may reduce imports as well (Barnett et al 2004). 
OPEC (2012a) projects reduction in crude oil demand in OECD countries by 
5.7mb/d from 2016 to 2035 in its 2012 World Oil Outlook.  According to 
Ghanem et al (1999) the imposition of a carbon tax in the  OECD regions or 
Annex 1 countries that is sufficient to meet the count ry-level Kyoto and 
post-Kyoto CO2 emissions targets, would result in a fall in OECD oil 
demand by 6.5million barrels of crude oil per day, and this translates to a 
loss in annual OPEC oil export revenue by US$23 billion.  
In order to develop policies to address the expected impacts of these 
external demand shocks on OPEC economies, there is need to understand 
the crude oil exports demand security risks facing OPEC member states 
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respectively. While the crude oil index is the subject of interest, the gas 
index is introduced to show that energy exports demand security risks 
differ under different energy types. Furthermore, the indexes designed in 
this study do not show the actual impact of energy exports demand shocks 
on OPEC economies as they are specifically d eveloped to show comparison 
between OPEC member states energy export demand security risks. The 
structure of the paper is as follows. After this section is the literature 
review in section two while the methodology comes up in section three. 
The data are discussed briefly in section four while the results are 
presented in section five. The conclusion and policy implications come up 
in section six. 
2.  Literature Review  
In the energy economics literature, very little contributions exist in this 
area of study as regards energy exports demand security risks. However, 
there are numerous contributions in the literature on the external energy 
supply security risks. On the energy supply security side, Le  Coq and 
Paltseva (2009), Gupta (2008), Frondel (2008), Neumann ( 2007, 2004), De 
Jong et al (2007), Roller et al (2007), and Blyth and Lefevre (2004) 
developed indexes to measure the risk exposure level of major energy 
importing countries and regions.  Le  Coq and Paltseva (2009) proposed a 
set of indexes to evaluate the external energy security risks facing the EU 
countries. This set of indexes focused on the disaggregated energy types 
by measuring the risks related to the external supply of oil, gas and coal. 
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They also covered the contribution of each member country to the EU 
energy security risk exposure. In designing these indexes, Le  Coq and 
Paltseva (2009) used the Herfindahl-Hirschmann (HH) index to capture the 
concept of energy supply diversity. Gupta (2008) also used an adjusted HH 
index to measure the risks related to the diversity of external supply of 
crude oil but differs from Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) by considering a 
single energy type – crude oil. Frondel (2008) applied the HH index as well 
in measuring the diversity of energy supply but did not take into a ccount 
the transaction risk factors. Neumann (2007) considered a disaggregated 
external energy supply security risk index comparable with Le Coq and 
Paltseva (2009) but different in some areas due to the composition of 
items in the measure of the index. Wh ile Neumann (2004; 2007) used the 
Shannon-Wiener index in measuring diversity, Le  Coq and Paltseva (2009) 
used the HH index. The Neumann (2004; 2007) indexes did not consider 
the transaction risks as provided in the Le  Coq and Paltseva (2009) 
indexes. Roller et al (2007) and De Jong et al (2007) also proposed a set of 
indexes but their studies were based on the aggregate measure of the 
energy types.  
This study develops two major indexes similar to Le  Coq’s and Paltseva’s 
(2009) Risky External Energy Security (REES) and Contribution to EU11 Risk 
Exposure (CERE) indexes because of the clarity and systematic 
considerations of the individual country’s risk share vis -à-vis the 
                                                          
11
 European Union 
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contribution to the regional or group’s common risk. Although, this study 
is tailored after the works of Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) and Neumann 
(2004; 2007), they are different in so many ways. In this study, the focus is 
on OPEC and energy exports demand security risks, while  the works of  Le 
Coq and Paltseva (2009), Neumann (2004; 2007), R oller et al (2007) and De 
Jong et al (2007) are focused on the energy importing countries and 
energy supply security risks. Roller et al (2007) and De Jong et al (2007) 
specifically differ from this study in the aspect of the energy types 
measured. In their measurement of the energy supply security risks, they 
aggregated the energy types, while this study disaggregated the energy 
types into crude oil and gas just like Le  Coq and Paltseva (2009) and 
Neumann (2004; 2007).   
On the energy demand security side,  Ghanem et al (1999) and Van der 
Linden et al (2000) focused on quantifying the impacts of decline in crude 
oil demand, as a result of the implementations of the Kyoto Protocol 
targets, on OPEC economies. Ghanem et al (1999) considered the cost 
implications of OECD carbon taxes for OPEC member states. They 
measured how the reduction in crude oil demand by OECD regions (in 
order to achieve the Kyoto targets through responses and policy measures 
in the form of carbon taxes) is expected to reduce OPEC’s oil ex port 
revenue. The work of Ghanem et al (1999) is scientific like this study but 
differs in many ways. Ghanem et al (1999) do not show a disaggregated 
country level risk analysis like this study. Their work also focus on a single 
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energy type – crude oil while this study focuses on two energy types –  
crude oil and gas, which are the major fossil energy exports of OPEC 
member states. Van der Linden et al (2000) developed different scenarios 
to determine how the Kyoto Protocol’s policy responses of the oil 
importing countries (OECD) would affect OPEC economies. Although, Van 
der Linden et al (2000) measured the risks arising from the impacts of 
implementing Kyoto targets on OPEC economies, which is similar to this 
study’s measurement of the crude oil and gas exp orts demand security 
risks, their approach is totally different from the approach used in this 
study. While they developed scenarios based on market situations, this 
study develops indexes based on major indicators that affect the crude oil 
exports demand for OPEC member states. This study is also different from 
Ghanem et al (1999) and Van der Linden et al (2000) because they show 
the actual impacts of demand shocks on OPEC economies while this 
study’s indexes do not show such actual impacts but relative ri sks level 
with a view to compare the country-level risks exposures of OPEC 
members to energy exports demand shocks. The non -availability of a 
demand side driven energy security risks index in the energy economics 
literature makes the REED and CORE indexes original, unique and 
distinctive. 
3. Methodology  
In assessing the comparative vulnerabilities of OPEC economies to energy 
exports demand shocks, this study develops indexes that combine diverse 
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factors to measure these risks which makes it possible for the mo del to 
accommodate as many factors as possible to enhance the robustness of 
the model. The index method is considered appropriate for this study 
because proxies can be used for the factors that do not have sufficient 
data and it also suits the multidimensional nature of the factors that 
affect OPEC’s crude oil and gas exports.  
The first index developed in this study, the Risky Energy Exports Demand 
(REED) index, combines measures of export dependency, monopsony risk, 
transaction cost risk and the economic importance of each energy types 
for the countries’ energy exports bundle respectively. The REED index is 
uniquely designed and it covers the twelve (12) OPEC member states and 
their crude oil and gas exports. This study ranks the OPEC member states 
according to each country’s index while comparing them and also 
compares the crude oil indexes with the natural gas indexes respectively.  
The REED index is a multiplicative index because of the relationship 
between the various factors that affect OPEC’s crude oi l  and gas exports. 
This is based on the assumption that each of the factors or indicators 
would contribute more to OPEC external energy demand security risks 
when the other factors or indicators exist. Using any other mathematical 
operation like addition or sum of the indicators would undermine the 
degree of in-exclusivity of this interdependent relationship. However, if 
the value of any of the indicators is equal to zero the REED value tends to 
be zero. This possibility is taken care of in the REED index b y the 
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assumptions and a priori characteristics of OPEC member states. These 
assumptions are that the country or group of countries must: (a) be a 
producer of crude oil and natural gas or the commodity in question (b) be 
an exporter of crude oil and natural  gas or the commodity in question (c) 
be exporting crude oil and gas or the commodity in question to three or 
more countries (d) have a heterogeneous energy bundle or a 
heterogeneous bundle of the commodity in question. Therefore, these a 
priori assumptions must be satisfied before applying the REED index as a 
measure of energy demand security risks for any country or group of 
countries.  
This index is designed to measure the present and potential risks related 
to the demand security of OPEC’s energy export s. It measures the short 
term risks related to the security of demand for energy exports 
considering cases of either sudden or gradual discontinuation of demand 
for crude oil and gas from the importing countries.  
3.1 Composition of the REED Index 
As mentioned above, the REED index combines measures of energy exports 
dependency (X), monopsony risk (M), transaction cost risk (D) and the 
economic importance (E) of both crude oil and natural gas.  
3.1.1 Export Dependence  
 The measure of energy export dependence (X) matters a lot in this 
estimation and forms the foundation for the REED index. The energy 
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export dependence is calculated as the ratio of the value of crude oil and 
gas exports to the total export value. The larger the quantity of crude oil 
and gas exports in a country’s total export value, the higher the energy 
exports demand risks.  
Export dependence (X) = Energy Exports (EE)/Total Exports 
(tot_exports)... ........................................................................ (i) 
3.1.2 Monopsony Factor   
The size of the share of imports of an importing country in a country’s 
crude oil and gas exports is also considered in designing the REED index. 
The larger the size of a country’s import share of OPEC members’ exports, 
the higher the country’s monopsony power on OPEC member states. 
Similarly, with the increase in the monopsony power of any individual 
importing country, the higher the risk exposure of OPEC member states. 
The diversification of the size of the importing country’s share of OPEC’s 
energy exports is calculated using the HH index approach which entails the 
sum of squares of the different importer’s share in the total average daily 
exports. The HH index model emphasises more on the larger market 
concentration which satisfies the study’s assumption that all things being 
equal, the consumption and import decisions of the country with the a 
major chunk of OPEC’s daily exports affect the crude oil and gas export 
demand security .  
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Monopsony Factor (M) =          imp_country  (a,b, . . . z )  
2  .......... .............  (ii) 
                                           tot_exports  
 
(Where imp_country = country a, b, ... z imports from OPEC’s crude oil 
/gas and tot_exports = total exports of OPEC’s crude oil/ gas)  
In measuring the diversity of import share of OPEC’s energy importers, 
other alternative means considered are the Shanon -Wiener index, Gini 
index and Weitzman index (Stirling, 2010). However, these approaches do 
not meet the market concentration requirement for the diversification of 
the crude oil and gas import share. While the Shanon-Wiener and Gini 
indexes put more weight on the impact of smaller market participants and 
the Weitzman index emphasises on the number of categories of the 
participants, the HH index places more emphasis on larger marke t 
participants. 
 3.1.3 Transaction Costs   
Another factor considered in designing the REED index is the transaction 
cost (D) as a result of the transportation and infrastructural disruptions. 
The distance between the capitals of the exporting and importing 
countries is used as proxy for the different causes of transportation and 
infrastructural disruptions and the size of the transaction costs. The 
distance between OPEC member states and their respective major 
importers are classified into three groups with the following thresholds. 
The countries with a distance of less than 1500km have a transaction cost 
index of 1; while the countries with a distance of 1501km to 4000km have 
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a transaction cost index of 2; and the countries with a distance of 4001km 
and above have a transaction cost index of 3. The longer the distance 
between these countries, the higher the risk of crude oil and gas exports 
demand security because in the event of a fall in prices due to external 
shocks or otherwise, the value of the transacti on costs may be considered 
in determining the profit or loss from the crude oil and gas exports as this 
study assumes that, with external demand shocks, the crude oil 
transaction system may change from FOB 12 (which is mostly in vogue now) 
to CIF13 where the sellers bear the burden of the transportation, insurance 
and other transaction costs when vessels are used for the transportation 
of crude oil exports. In the case where pipelines are used for the 
transportation of crude oil exports, this study assumes als o that, when the 
distance of the pipeline is longer, it would traverse more countries and 
the risks of disruption which falls under transaction costs as well, will be 
higher. Examples of such pipelines are the Iraq – Turkey crude oil pipelines 
and the Algeria – Europe gas pipelines. 
        1, if dist_btw_capitals ≤ 1,500 km  
D =         2, if 1,500 km ˂ dist_btw_capitals  ≤ 4000 km     ................. (iii) 
        3, if dist_btw_capitals > 4000 km 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Free on Board 
13
 Costs, Insurance and Freight 
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3.1.4 Economic Dependence   
The economic impact (E) of  the crude oil and gas exports on OPEC member 
states is also considered in the REED index by estimating the ratio of the 
export value of the crude oil and gas respectively to the economic output. 
This entails the contribution of the crude oil and gas expor ts to the OPEC 
member states’ gross domestic product (GDP). The more dependent the 
economy is on crude oil and/or gas exports, the higher the security of 
demand risks.  
E = exp_val /GDP.................................................... ..............  (iv) 
(where exp_val = value of OPEC’s energy export and GDP = Gross Domestic 
Product value [all in billions of US Dollar])  
Therefore, the REED index for each OPEC member state and the different 
energy types of crude oil and gas is defined by the following equa tion 
which encapsulates all the factors described above:  
REED = X*M*D*E.............................................. .....................  (v)  
The higher the countries index the more risky the energy export demand 
security.  
3.2 The CORE Index 
The impact of the respective countries risks to the entire OPEC risk 
exposure is also estimated as the second index.  This is the contribution to 
the OPEC risk exposure (CORE). Theoretically, the country with more risk 
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exposure individually would contribute more to th e group’s total risk 
exposure (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009), i.e., a country with a high REED 
index will contribute more to OPEC’s group risk to the security of demand. 
The country with a large share in OPEC’s quota of crude oil and gas 
exports will also contribute more to OPEC’s group risk.  
CORE = REED * S/ ∑ (REED*S) ............................ ......................  (vi) 
Where, S is the share of the individual country in total OPEC crude oil and 
gas exports.  
4. Data 
In computing the REED indexes for crude oil  and gas, and the CORE index, 
this study relies on the data on crude oil and gas exports, imports and 
consumption from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins, the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) database and international trades’ data 
of OPEC member states. The indexes are specifically based on the 2009 
data for the twelve (12) OPEC member states (OPEC, 2010). The data on 
natural gas exports are adjusted in line with the model specification. The 
data sets are available in Appendix A.  
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5. Results 
The results of the study showing the REED index and CORE index 
respectively are presented below in tables 1 and 2.  
Table 1: The REED Index 
OPEC Member 
States 
  Crude Oil REED Index      Gas REED Index 
Algeria 0.07 1.21 
Angola 0.58 0.00 
Ecuador 0.06 0.00 
Iran 0.08 0.00 
Iraq 0.26 0.00 
Kuwait 0.36 0.00 
Libya 0.14 0.06 
Nigeria 0.17 0.12 
Qatar 0.08 4.98 
Saudi Arabia 0.17 0.00 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.05 0.02 
Venezuela 0.07 0.00 
Average 0.18 0.53 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.16 1.44 
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Table 2: CORE Index 
OPEC Member States Crude Oil (%)              Gas (%) 
Algeria 2.1 16 
Angola 22 0 
Ecuador 0.4 0 
Iran 4 0 
Iraq 10 0 
Kuwait 16 0 
Libya 5 0 
Nigeria 7 1 
Qatar 1.5 83 
Saudi Arabia 25 0 
United Arab Emirates 3 0 
Venezuela 4 0 
Total 100 100 
 
5.1. Crude Oil Indexes 
The differences in exports, distance(s) of the exports destination, 
diversification of importing countries and economic outputs determine the 
difference in the indexes of the respective OPEC members. For instance, a 
country with a high crude oil export value in its total exports is expected 
to have a high index, hence a high risk level. The same applies for the 
other indicators.  
For the purpose of this study, the index is calibrated under three 
categories. The countries with indexes that are abov e 0.20 are high risk 
countries while the ones with indexes between 0.10 and 0.20 are the 
medium risk countries and the ones below 0.10 are low risk countries. The 
crude oil REED index in table 1 shows that Angola, Iraq, and Kuwait have 
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high crude oil demand security risks. This is explained by their heavy crude 
oil exports dependence, as crude oil accounts for over 90% of their total 
exports and over 40% of their GDP except Iraq which has 38% economic 
dependence level but has a high transaction risk. Some o f these countries 
are in this category because of their high monopsony risks or high 
transaction risks due to the long distance from their major crude oil trade 
partners or countries.  
The next category is the medium crude oil demand security risk countrie s 
such as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Although, these countries have a 
high crude oil exports dependence level, their economic dependence level 
are lower compared to the high level crude oil demand security risk 
countries except Libya which has 59% economic dependence level. They 
also have low monopsony risks and moderate transaction risks. Libya has 
high energy export dependence as about 99% of total exports in 2009 
were energy based but has low monopsony and transaction risks.  
The third category is the low level crude oil demand security risk 
countries. These countries are Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Qatar, UAE and 
Venezuela. Some of these countries also have high crude oil exports 
dependence level but very low economic dependence level and low 
monopsony risks. Countries like Ecuador and Venezuela have low 
transaction risks as they are very close to their major crude oil trade 
partners or countries.  
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The contributions to OPEC’s risk exposure follow a similar pattern but with 
respect to a country’s share of  OPEC’s total energy exports as well. The 
countries with high crude oil demand security risks and/or large share of 
OPEC’s total energy exports contribute more, while countries with medium 
demand security risks and/or moderate share of OPEC’s total energy 
exports contribute moderately and the countries with low demand 
security risks and/or small share of OPEC’s total energy exports contribute 
less to OPEC’s risk exposure.  
5.2. Gas Indexes 
The gas REED index follows the same calibration categories like the crude 
oil index but shows a distinct pattern in values. The OPEC member states 
exporting natural gas in 2009 are few and their export demand security 
risks are analysed below. The countries with high gas demand security risk 
are Qatar and Algeria with high export and economic dependence levels. 
The other countries do not show significant gas demand security risks as 
they are either non-exporters of gas or their exports are insignificant 
compared to Algeria’s and Qatar’s gas exports. Countries, such as Nigeria, 
Libya, Iran and UAE fall under the latter category and have low export and 
economic dependence levels. The other countries, Angola, Ecuador, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela did not export gas during the period 
under review, hence no risk identified.   
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The contributions to OPEC’s gas demand security risk exposure follow the 
same trend. The high demand security risk countries contribute more to 
OPEC’s risk exposure with Qatar responsible for 83% of the OPEC’s risk 
exposure while Algeria accounts for 16% and Nigeria contributes 
approximately 1%. The contributions of other countries to OPEC’s gas 
demand security risk exposure are not significant.  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study designs a set of indexes to measure the crude oil and gas 
exports’ demand security risks facing OPEC members. The study’s focus is 
on the impacts of the externally induced crude oil and gas demand shocks 
on OPEC member states. 
The indexes designed in this study take into account the crude oil and gas 
exports profile of OPEC members, economic output levels, risks associated 
with the size and destination of exports and transportation and disruption 
related factors. By calculating the indexes for two energy types, crude oil 
and gas, the study finds that the level of risks d iffer across energy types 
and the different OPEC member states.  
The outcome of this study may have implications for the design, 
implementation and sustainability of a common energy policy for OPEC 
members. The security of demand for OPEC’s crude oil has b ecome 
paramount, considering the crude oil exports dependence of these OPEC 
member states and the risks associated with such dependence. OPEC as an 
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organisation may opt for common strategies that would protect its 
members’ economies from any adverse effect  related to external demand 
shocks. However, the differences in energy export demand security risks 
across these countries may be a barrier to OPEC’s common energy policy 
as the preferences over such policy may also differ among OPEC member 
states. The geographical spread of OPEC member states may also be an 
obstacle to a common energy policy as the membership of OPEC cuts 
across three continents with different geo -political realities. 
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9. Appendix A  
Table A1: Primary Data for Crude oil (Source OPEC 2012 Annual Statistical 
Bulletin) 
OPEC 
Members 
Oil  
Export 
($B) 
Total 
Export 
($B) 
GDP($B) Exp. 
Dep. (X) 
Economic 
Dep. (E) 
Monopsony 
(M) 
D 
Algeria 30.58 48.52 138.15 0.630256 0.221354 0.266592 2 
Angola 39.8 40.83 75.51 0.974773 0.527083 0.378577 3 
Ecuador 6.97 13.79 52.02 0.505439 0.133987 0.936437 1 
Iran 55.75 87.53 360.63 0.636924 0.154591 0.265159 3 
Iraq 41.67 42.41 110.97 0.982551 0.375507 0.231042 3 
Kuwait 48.91 53.97 105.93 0.906244 0.46172 0.285279 3 
Libya 36.97 37.06 62.96 0.997572 0.587198 0.246223 1 
Nigeria 44.73 52.66 165.76 0.849411 0.269848 0.381284 2 
Qatar 19.13 48.31 97.8 0.395984 0.195603 0.53202 2 
Saudi 
Arabia 161.91 192.3 376.69 0.841966 0.429823 0.229366 2 
UAE 52.87 191.78 270.34 0.27568 0.195569 0.461844 2 
Venezuela 54.2 57.6 329.79 0.940972 0.164347 0.451485 1 
OPEC total 
Oil  export 593.49 
       
Table A2: Primary Data for Gas (Source OPEC 2012 Annual Statistical 
Bulletin) 
OPEC 
Members 
Gas 
Exports($B)  X E M D 
Algeria 123.2478 2.540144 0.89213 0.266592 2 
Angola 0 0 0 0 3 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 1 
Iran 13.2678 0.15158 0.036791 0.265159 3 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 3 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 3 
Libya 23.1426 0.624463 0.367576 0.246223 1 
Nigeria 37.4166 0.710532 0.225728 0.381284 2 
Qatar 148.6602 3.077214 1.520043 0.53202 2 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 0 0 0 2 
UAE 35.5914 0.185585 0.131654 0.461844 2 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 1 
 381.3264 
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Table A3: Computation Output for the CORE Index  
OPEC 
Members 
 
 
CRUDE OIL 
 
GAS 
Crude 
Oil  REED 
Index 
Share(S) 
of OPEC 
Exports 
REED*
S CORE 
Gas REED 
Index 
Share (S) of 
OPEC 
Exports 
REED
*S CORE 
Algeria 
0.07438
403 0.0515 
0.003
833 
0.021
358 
1.208267
501 0.323208 
0.390
522 
0.166
2846
8 
Angola 
0.58352
2624 0.0671 
0.039
132 
0.218
062 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 
0.06341
7535 0.0117 
0.000
745 
0.004
15 0 0 0 0 
Iran 
0.07832
4807 0.0939 
0.007
358 0.041 
0.004436
162 0.034794 
0.000
154 
6.572
28E-
05 
Iraq 
0.25573
2438 0.0702 
0.017
955 
0.100
057 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 
0.35810
9376 0.0824 
0.029
512 
0.164
457 0 0 0 0 
Libya 
0.14423
0768 0.0623 
0.008
985 
0.050
066 
0.056517
548 0.06069 
0.003
43 
0.001
4605
13 
Nigeria 
0.17478
9819 0.0754 
0.013
174 
0.073
41 
0.122305
779 0.098122 
0.012
001 
0.005
1100
04 
Qatar 
0.08241
6021 0.0322 
0.002
657 
0.014
804 
4.977039
95 0.38985 
1.940
3 
0.826
1821
53 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.16601
3391 0.2728 
0.045
29 
0.252
381 0 0 0 0 
UAE 
0.04980
0132 0.0891 
0.004
436 
0.024
722 
0.022568
465 0.093336 
0.002
106 
0.000
8969
27 
Venezuel
a 
0.06982
0277 0.0913 
0.006
376 
0.035
532 0 0 0 0 
 
Avg = 
0.17504
6768 
 
∑ = 
0.179
451 ∑= 1  
Avg = 
0.532594
617 
 
∑ = 
2.348
514 ∑= 1  
 
STDEV= 
0.15816
9907 
   
STDEV= 
1.441137
009 
    
